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The Religion Clauses and Parental Health
Care Decisionmaking for Children:
Suggestions for a New Approach
By ANN MACLEAN MASSm*
Introduction
NEGLECT [defined]. Negligent treatment or maltreatment of
a child, including the failure to provide adequate food, medical
treatment, clothing or shelter; provided, that a parent or guard-
ian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does
not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that rea-
son alone, shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian;
however, such an exception shall not preclude a court from or-
dering that medical services be provided to the child, where his
health requires it.'
What is wrong with this picture? Apparently nothing, in the eyes
of legislators in Alabama, at least forty-one other states, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. These forty-three jurisdictions have legislation ex-
empting spiritual treatment of minor children from the reach of either
regulatory or criminal statutes pertaining to dependent, abused, or ne-
glected children.2
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edged, along with special appreciation to Dean Randall P. Bezanson, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, for a thoughtful critique of an earlier version of this manuscript,
and most particularly to Professor Allan Ides, Washington and Lee University School of
Law, for his several readings and extremely helpful suggestions. Finally, I wish to thank
my able research assistant, Staci L. Stone, and to express my deepest gratitude for her last-
minute volunteer research and preparation assistance to my friend, Lorri Olan, J.D.,
Northeastern University School of Law, 1992; B.A., Oberlin College, 1987.
1. ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1992) (emphasis added).
2. Eight of these states include such exemptions in both regulatory and criminal
codes. In addition to the regulatory Alabama statute quoted, see ALA. CODE § 13A-13-
6(b) (1982) (criminal child endangerment); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1993) (criminal
nonsupport); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.020(8)(d) (1990) (reporting); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-201.01 (1989) (regulatory definition); A=Z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1989) (termi-
nation of parent-child relationship); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-546(B) (Supp. 1993) (reg-
ulatory definition); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(4)(c) (Michie 1987) (criminal offense of
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permitting child abuse); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-30-103(5)(B) (Michie 1991) (regulatory defi-
nition); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1993) (criminal child abandonment and neglect);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West 1984) (jurisdiction); COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 19-3-
103(1) (West Supp. 1993) (criminal child neglect); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-401 (West
Supp. 1993) (criminal child abuse); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-104 (West 1992) (report-
ing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 (West. Supp. 1993) (regulatory definition); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1974) (criminal child endangerment); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356
(1988) (reporting); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(f) (1988) (regulatory definition); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(f) (West Supp. 1993) (regulatory definition); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-2(8)(D) (Supp. 1992) (regulatory definition); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1987)
(criminal nonsupport); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 5/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (reporting);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4(a)(4) (Bums 1985) (criminal child neglect); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 726.6(1)(d) (West 1993) (criminal child endangerment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608
(1)(c) (1988) (criminal child endangerment); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (Baldwin
1990) (regulatory definition); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(4) (West 1986) (criminal
child abuse); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (West 1983) (criminal offenses against
the family); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010(1), (2) (West Supp. 1992) (criminal child
endangerment); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(n)(2) (1991) (regulatory definition);
MicH. Com. LAws ANN. § 722.634 (§ 14) (West 1993) (reporting); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.378(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (criminal child neglect); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
105 (l)(i), (in) (Supp. 1992) (regulatory definition); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1993) (reporting); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.5085 (Michie 1992) (criminal child
neglect); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(IV) (1986) (criminal child endangerment); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(c) (1990) (regulatory definition); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-
1.1 (West 1993) (regulatory definition); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.21(c) (West 1993) (regula-
tory definition); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(L)(5), (M)(4) (Michie Supp. 1992) (regulatory
definition); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1989) (criminal child endangerment);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989) (reporting); OrIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (Baldwin 1992) (criminal child endangerment); OHio Rsv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.03(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (regulatory definition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852
(West Supp. 1994) (criminal omission to fail to provide for a child); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419.500(1) (1991) (reporting); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (Supp. 1991) (regulatory
definition); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1990) (regulatory definition); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-57(B) (Supp. 1993) (criminal contribution to neglect); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-
19.5 (1992) (jurisdiction); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912(3)(c) (1991) (regulatory defini-
tion); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (Michie 1988) (criminal failure to secure medical atten-
tion for injured child); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(2) (Michie 1988) (regulatory definition);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(C) (Michie Supp. 1993) (criminal child abuse and neglect);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1993) (regulatory definition); W. VA.
CODE § 49-7-7(c) (1992) (criminal contribution to child neglect); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(c)(4) (West 1987) (reporting); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.03(6) (West 1988) (report-
ing); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(6) (West Supp. 1993) (criminal child abuse); Wyo. STAT.
§ 14-3-202(a)(vii) (Supp. 1993) (regulatory definition).
In addition, three states' regulatory provisions are ambiguous. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1993) (defining a "Neglected Juvenile" as one who, inter alia, "is not
provided necessary medical care or other remedial care recognized under State law"); see
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4) (1991) (similar wording); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(C)(3) (Law Co-op. 1985) (similar wording). It is unclear whether spiritual treatment
of a minor otherwise meeting the definition would constitute "other remedial care" recog-
nized by these states' laws. Thus, only five states have no provisions possibly exempting
from their child abuse and neglect laws parents who choose to treat their children's severe
medical conditions by spiritual means alone: Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. § 350-4 (Supp.
1992) (former religious exemption repealed); Massachusetts, S. 219, 178th Gen. Ct., 1993
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While some dispute the wisdom3 or legitimacy4 of the italicized
provision, many people seem to agree that an exemption from regula-
tory or criminal statutes for religiously motivated parental behavior
simply manifests appropriate respect for religious diversity in a heter-
ogeneous society.5 Yet the past ten years have seen an increasing
Mass. Sess. (Dec. 28, 1993) (striking sentence containing exemption from MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §1(4) (West 1990)); and Nebraska, South Dakota, and Texas; see U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, STATE STATUTES RELATED TO CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECr 1986 724, 727, 728 (1987) (noting South Dakota repeal and also that no
exemption statutes could be found for Nebraska or Texas).
3. See, e.g., RITA SwAN, CRY, THE BELOVED CHILDREN (1993) (urging repeal of ex-
emptions); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a
New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18
PEPp. L. REV. 319 (1991) (urging repeal of exemptions, calling on the Department of
Health and Human Services to require repeal by states, and questioning constitutionality
of exemptions); Janet J. Anderson, Note, Capital Punishment of Kids: When Courts Permit
Parents to Act on Their Religious Beliefs at the Expense of Their Children's Lives, 46 VAND.
L. Rv. 755 (1993) (advocating prosecution of parents whose children die after spiritual
treatment); Donna K. LeClair, Comment, Faith-Healing and Religious-Treatment Exemp-
tions to Child-Endangerment Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure
to Provide Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REv. 79 (1987) (urging
pressure on state legislatures to repeal exemptions); Judith I. Scheiderer, Note, When Chil-
dren Die as a Result of Religious Practices, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1429 (1990) (opposing exemp-
tions and calling for murder (rather than manslaughter) prosecutions). See also American
Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, Religious Exemptions from Child Abuse
Statutes, 81 PEDIATRICS 169 (Jan. 1988); Religious Exemptions in Child Abuse Legislation,
PROCEEDINGS HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Bd. of Trustees, Am. Med. Ass'n), Dec. 7-10, 1988,
at 145; Edward Dolnick, Murder by Faith, IN HEALTH, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 59; Andrew Skol-
nick, Religious Exemptions to Child Neglect Laws Still Being Passed Despite Convictions of
Parents, 264 JAMA 1226 (1990); Christopher B. Daly, Faith-Healing on Trial in Boston,
WASH. POST, May 22, 1990, at A3.
4. See, e.g., RITA SWAN, THE LAW'S RESPONSE WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AGAINST
MEDICAL CARE IMPACT ON CHILDREN 52-54 (1990) [hereinafter SWAN, LAW'S RESPONSE]
(arguing against exemptions on both policy and constitutional grounds); see generally
Monopoli, supra note 3 (questioning constitutionality); Jennifer Trahan, Constitutional
Law: Parental Denial of a Child's Medical Treatment for Religious Reasons, 1989 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 307 (questioning constitutionality of some specific formulations that desig-
nate only Christian Scientists or that "require spiritual treatment according to the tenets of
a recognized church by an accredited practitioner"); Rita Swan, Should Government Rule
When Faith, Science, Clash? Pro: First Amendment Does Not Give the Right to Injure Chil-
dren, L.A. TiMEs, July 14, 1990, at F16, F17.
5. See, e.g., JoAnna A. Gekas, Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HAS-
TINGS CONT. L.Q. 395 (1987) (respecting parental religious rights but also proposing statu-
tory amendments to resolve constitutional problems and to require medical care where
permanent physical damage to child could result); Daniel J. Kearney, Comment, Parental
Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's
Death-Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REv. 861 (1986) (decrying
unfairness of criminal punishment where parents have lost a child and proposing statute
recognizing exemption from criminal liability while permitting courts to order medical
care); Shelli D. Robinson, Comment, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child?, 7
J. Com'EMP. L. & POL'Y 413 (1991) (defending rights of parents to make medical decisions
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number of state prosecutions of parents for such crimes as involuntary
manslaughter or felony child endangerment in circumstances where
their minor child has been treated by spiritual means alone and has
died from conditions commonly thought treatable by conventional
medical care.' Prosecutions and convictions have been upheld in a
number of reported cases.7 Where they have been struck down, the
basis for reversal has commonly been a lack of due process, namely,
the failure to provide adequate notice of criminality to parents relying
for minor children for either religious or non-religious reasons); Edward E. Smith, Note,
The Criminalization of Belief. When Free Exercise Isn't, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (1991) (ar-
guing that prosecution for spiritual treatment violates free exercise rights because assessing
culpability necessarily involves punishinent of belief, not just practice); Deborah S. Steck-
ler, Note, A Trend Toward Declining Rigor in Applying Free Exercise Principles: The Ex-
ample of State Courts' Consideration of Christian Science Treatment for Children, 36 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 487 (1991) (similarly arguing that assessment of culpability is a judgment of
reasonableness of belief, an inquiry prohibited by free exercise principles); Eric W. Treene,
Note, Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, Manslaughter
Prosecutions and Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (1993) (defending ex-
emptions but proposing amendments to require parental notification to child welfare au-
thorities if child has severe illness and permitting court to order treatment where
appropriate). Federal agency support for the exemption is discussed infra, note 45 and
accompanying text.
6. Rita Swan lists 42 prosecutions and their prosecutors. Forty of the cases involved
deaths. Charges are pending in three of the cases. Of the remaining 39, 23 resulted in
convictions at the trial level (although three were overturned); seven cases involved pleas
of guilty or no contest; six resulted in acquittals; and charges were dismissed in three on
constitutional grounds. The list was last updated February 20, 1993. RrrA SwAN,
CHARGES FILED SINCE 1982 AGAINST PARENTS WHO Wrrm-mLD LIFESAVING MEDICAL
CARE FROM CHILDREN ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS 1, 15 (1993). Rita Swan is a former
Christian Scientist whose 15-month-old son died of bacterial meningitis. She and her hus-
band sued the church for misdiagnosis under Michigan's medical malpractice act, but the
case was dismissed. Brown v. Laitner, 435 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1989). She founded Children's
Healthcare Is a Legal Duty (CHILD, Inc.), an organization dedicated to children's rights
to "health care of proven value without exception for religious belief." SWAN, supra note
3, at 1.
7. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989) (prosecution for manslaughter and felony child endangerment upheld where four-
year-old died of acute meningitis); People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1667 (1991)
(conviction for felony child endangerment upheld where eight-month-old died of bacterial
meningitis); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986) (conviction for reckless homicide
upheld where child died of pneumonia); Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ctv App.
1985) (convictions for reckless homicide and neglect of a dependent upheld when nine-
month-old died of bacterial meningitis); Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989) (conviction for second-degree manslaughter
upheld in death of three-month-old from pneumonia); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497
A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988) (conviction for involuntary
manslaughter upheld in death of two-year-old from cancer); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d
1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (conviction for first-degree manslaughter upheld in death of
10-year-old from juvenile diabetes).
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on statutory exemptions.' In other words, state courts have generally
agreed that exemptions for religiously motivated parental behavior
found in statutes defining civil duties or misdemeanor neglect never-
theless do not evidence legislative intent to bar prosecutions for felo-
nious parental behavior resulting in death as delineated in other
sections of the criminal code,9 although some appellate courts have
reversed convictions on the grounds that defendants should have been
permitted to present a defense of reasonable reliance on an exemp-
tion.10 Defenses based solely on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment have not been persuasive."
8. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991) (conviction for felony child abuse in
death of five-week-old from pneumonia reversed for erroneous instructions on the "treat-
ment by spiritual means" defense); Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1991) (convic-
tion for felony child abuse and third-degree murder for death of four-year-old from
juvenile diabetes reversed on the grounds that parents lacked fair notice of the point at
which their conduct became criminal); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass.
1993) (conviction for involuntary manslaughter where two-year-old died of bowel obstruc-
tion reversed and remanded for failure to instruct on affirmative defense of parents' rea-
sonable belief that they were protected by the statutory exemption); State v. McKown, 475
N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1992) (conviction for second-degree
manslaughter in death of 11-year-old from juvenile diabetes reversed for lack of fair notice
where parents relied on spiritual treatment exemption); State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d
931 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) (charges in death of child dismissed on due process/lack of
fair notice grounds, but spiritual treatment exemption held unconstitutional); cf State v.
Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (acquittal on charges of misdemeanor
manslaughter affirmed where nine-year-old died of peritonitis, on grounds that statutory
exemption provided a defense).
9. Walker, 763 P.2d at 856-66; Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1686-88; Lybarger, 807
P.2d at 575-79; Hall, 493 N.E.2d at 435; Bergmann, 486 N.E.2d at 660-62; Twitchell, 617
N.E.2d at 614; McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 65-67; Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 620-21; Funkhouser,
763 P.2d at 697. Contra Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 775-77 (statutes are ambiguous and
create a trap for religiously motivated parents); Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 938 (statute fails
to provide notice of what conduct is forbidden); Lockhart, 664 P.2d at 1060 (exemption
statute provided a defense).
10. Lybarger, 807 P.2d at 570; Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 609.
11. Walker, 763 P.2d at 869-71; Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1688-89; Barnhart, 497
A.2d at 621-25; Norman, 808 P.2d at 1163.
In Minnesota, where the state supreme court reversed a mother's and a stepfather's
second-degree manslaughter convictions for lack of adequate notice, a civil jury last sum-
mer awarded the child's natural father more than five million dollars in compensatory
damages against the same parties and four other defendants, as well as an additional nine
million dollars in punitive damages against the Christian Science Church, of which the
mother and stepfather were members. The defendants have appealed. See McKown, 475
N.W. 2d at 63; Patrick Sweeney, $5 Million Verdict Returned Christian Science Church,
Mother Held Responsible in Boy's Death, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al;
Patrick Sweeney, Jury Gives $9 Million in Punitive Damages Christian Science Church
Faces Cost in Death of Boy, 11, Who Had Diabetes, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 26,
1993 at Al; see also Christian Scientists Ordered to Pay $9 Million , CHRISTIANrrY TODAY,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 53; Patrick Sweeney, Activist Pleased That Jury Set Punitive Damages but
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Various groups and some commentators have called for the re-
peal of these laws, contending that they fail to protect children ade-
quately.12 Although a number of the exemptions, like the Alabama
law quoted above, explicitly provide for court-ordered medical care
where a child's life or welfare is at stake, 3 and although courts will
issue such orders even absent statutory authorization, 4 the case law is
inconsistent. 5 Furthermore, a number of severely ill children clearly
fail to come to the attention of the appropriate authorities in time to
save their lives or prevent debilitating effects to their health.'"
This Article argues that statutes providing exemptions from the
reach of child abuse and neglect laws for religiously motivated parents
She's Unsure if Church Will Alter Views, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESs, Aug. 26, 1993, at 6A
(noting Rita Swan's favorable reaction to the award).
12. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Rita Swan, Coalition to Repeal Religious
Exemptions to Child Abuse Laws, CHiLDREN's HEALTHCARE IS A LEGAL DUTY, INC.
(CHILD, Inc.), No. 4, 1992, at 2 (listing 27 groups as members of the Massachusetts Coali-
tion to Repeal Religious Exemptions to Child Abuse Laws).
13. In addition to Alabama, eleven other states specifically allow courts to order medi-
cal aid over religious objections. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-103(1) (Supp. 1993); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-6-401 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(f) (West Supp. 1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6(1)(d) (West Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1)
(Baldwin 1990); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-105(l)(i), (in) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.D. CNTr.
CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1994); OR
REv. STAT. § 419.500(1) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1990); see also infra notes 36,
40 and accompanying text (federal policy).
14. See People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.) (court ordered blood transfusion to
treat RH blood condition), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d
411 (Mass. 1991) (court ordered blood transfusion to treat leukemia); State v. Perricone,
181 A.2d 751 (N.J.) (in spite of the court-ordered blood transfusions to treat a heart mur-
mur, the child died), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320
A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (court ordered blood transfusion to treat jaun-
dice); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1976) (court ordered dental care);
In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (court ordered medical treatment
for osteogenic sarcoma); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (court ordered
blood transfusion to treat sickle-cell anemia); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983) (court ordered medical treatment for Ewing's Sarcoma); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
.S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (court ordered medical treatment for arthritis).
15. Compare In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955) (court dismissed petition re-
questing surgery for severe cleft palate and harelip because condition posed no present
emergency to life) with In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (court ordered surgery
to correct massive deformity of right side of face and neck); compare also Newmark v.
Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (court refrained from ordering cancer therapy because
chance of recovery was only 40%) with Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d at 425 (court ordered cancer
treatment when chance for recovery was 25-50%).
16. See SwApN, supra note 6, at 1-15 (describing forty-two prosecuted cases since 1982,
in forty of which the child had died); SWAN, supra note 3 (reporting deaths and debilitating
permanent effects of severely ill children untreated by conventional medical care for reli-
gious reasons); see generally SwAN, LAw's REsPONSE, supra note 4.
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who provide spiritual treatment rather than conventional medical care
for their severely ill minor children violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.17 Far from
constituting an appropriate preserve of free exercise values, or even a
permissible accommodation of religious diversity in a society that re-
spects heterogeneity, these laws impermissibly allow parents to im-
pose their own religious beliefs and practices upon their minor
children, who are incapable of making either religious or medical deci-
sions for themselves, precisely under circumstances in which those
children are the most vulnerable. -
Even assuming that the Free Exercise Clause protects some ele-
ments of conduct as well as belief,18 that protection ends where the
conduct violates the rights of another.. By permitting parents to vio-
late their children's own religious freedom,' 9 spiritual treatment ac-
commodation statutes overstep Establishment Clause boundaries. In
fact, they constitute a prohibited "endorsement" of religion under cri-
teria proposed by Justice Brennan, which serve well as a measuring
standard for the constitutional validity of laws exempting religiously
motivated behavior from otherwise applicable general regulations."
Additionally, these exemptions violate the rights of children
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2"
Children have never been defined as a suspect class requiring height-
ened scrutiny under equal protection doctrine,' but under the com-
17. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (discussing various philosophical
viewpoints with respect to this question).
19. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
20. Texas Monthly, Inc., v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); see infra notes 218-21 (dis-
cussing Justice Brennan's criteria); for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's development of
the "endorsement" concept, see infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
21. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
22. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, governmental
classifications of persons are generally, like most governmental actions, subjected by courts
only to a rational basis standard of review and will be upheld if they are reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental interest. However, classifications based upon certain "sus-
pect" categories, notably race or alienage, receive strict scrutiny and must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling governmental interest; classifications based on gender or illegiti-
macy receive a heightened review that is less than strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has
refused to extend heightened scrutiny to classifications based on wealth or age. See gener-
ally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.3, at 573-80
(4th ed. 1991); see also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMEticAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-31, at
1588-89 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing children as illustrative of a politically powerless minority
that does not receive heightened scrutiny).
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mon law concept of parens patriae,l and given that children have
their own constitutionally protected rights,24 state courts and the
United States Supreme Court have repeatedly regarded governmental
actions specifically affecting the welfare of children with special
care.25 In light of the particular obligations of government to protect
children, it is indefensible to hold that children who would be found
abused or neglected in one context are simply the legitimate objects of
their parents' religious rights in another.
Parents do have constitutionally protected rights to bring up and
educate their children as they see fit, including the specific right to
inculcate in their children their own religious views.26 Parental rights,
however, arise not from a concept that parents "own" their children, 7
23. "Literally, parent of the country, refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability .... It is the principle that the state must
care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care
and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(upholding the First Amendment rights of middle school and high school students to wear
black armbands to school protesting the Vietnam War); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (acknowledging student's First Amendment freedom of ex-
pression but distinguishing inker and upholding school's right to regulate vulgar and of-
fensive speech as a part of its educational function); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(addressing children's rights at delinquency hearing in juvenile court); see generally Nat
Stem, The Burger Court and the Diminishing Constitutional Rights of Minors: A Brief
Overview, 1985 ARiz. ST. LJ. 865, 870-80 (arguing that minors have distinct constitutional
rights); Bernard J. Coughlin, The Rights of Children, in THm RirHTS OF CHILDREN: EMER-
GENT CONCEPTS rN LAW AND SociETY 7 (Albert E. Wilkerson ed. 1973) (children have
inalienable rights including the right to life, food, and shelter); Lois G. Forer, Rights of
Children: The Legal Vacuum, in Tim RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra, at 24 (exploring ave-
nues for providing children with "substantive and procedural laws to guarantee and imple-
ment" their rights).
25. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (noting that dealing
with conflict between parents and state over control of child is serious); see also infra notes
256-66 and accompanying text; see generally SAMUEL M. DAVIs & MORTIMER D.
SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTs Am THE LAW 51-78 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court
cases dealing with children's rights).
26. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding rights of Old Order Amish
parents to withdraw children from school after the eighth grade, despite a statute requiring
them to continue in school until age sixteen); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (upholding rights of parents to send their children to private, rather than public,
school, specifically including a religiously affiliated school); see also Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding rights of parents to hire a teacher of German at a private
school, to that extent invalidating a statute forbidding teaching of a foreign language prior
to eighth grade).
27. Although the common law at one time regarded children as the property of their
parents, this view has been superseded out of concern for the well being of children; the
state may intervene on childrens' behalf when parents act to their detriment. See Angela
R. Holder, Special Categories of Consent Minors and Handicapped Newborns, in 3 TREA-
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but from the presumption that parents normally act in their children's
best interests.28 Therefore, their rights have always ended where dan-
ger to the welfare of their children begins.29 Indeed, the constitutional
protections governing parental rights (with the underlying assump-
tions upon which they are based) are themselves the appropriate
source of criteria in questions of medical decisionmaking for minor
children. When courts are called upon to decide whether to order
specific medical treatments for children over parental objection, their
decisions should be governed by appropriate respect for parental deci-
sioninaking rights, on the one hand, and appropriate concern for the
children's welfare, on the other. The presence or absence of religious
motivation in the parental decisionmaking process should be irrele-
vant. Viewed in this light, case outcomes concerning alleged abuse or
medical neglect of children, whether arising before any injury (in the
form of possible court orders mandating specific medical treatment)
or after a deleterious outcome (in the form of prosecutions or civil
lawsuits) should achieve a greater consistency as society strives to pro-
tect the health and welfare of all our children.
I. Legislative History: The Changing Shape of Federal Policy
The idea that parents may not use religious grounds to shield
themselves from prosecution for failure to provide adequate medical
care for their minor children is not new. Beginning with the New
York ruling in People v. Pierson,30 cases early in this century estab-
lished the general rule that spiritual healing alone was not sufficient to
TISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §§ 19.01, 19.05 (Michael G. MacDonald et al. eds., 1991);
Karen H. Rothenberg, Medical Decision Making for Children, in 1 BioLAw: A LEGAL AND
ETHICAL REPORTER ON MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND BIOENGINEERING § 8-2.1 (James
F. Childress et al. eds., 1989).
28. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979); see infra note 267 and accom-
panying text.
29. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("IN]either rights of religion
nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation."); id. at 170 (parents may not "make mar-
tyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion"); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (liberty is "regulated by law") (citing Crowley
v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTmc
RELATIONS iN Trm UNrrED STATES, 335 (2d ed. 1988) (parental health care decisionmak-
ing rights for minor children are "limited by the power of the state to intercede for the
protection of the child's health, safety or welfare"); id. § 19.1, at 788 ("When the child's
welfare seems to conflict with the claims of one or both parents, the child's welfare must
prevail."); see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 772 ("The line is drawn at the point at which
great bodily harm or death will result to a child."); see generally DAVIs & SCHWARTz,
supra note 25, at 79-95, 163-89 (discussing medical decisionmaking for children).
30. 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
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fulfill a parental duty of appropriate medical care for a child and, fur-
thermore, that the exercise of religious belief was not a defense to a
criminal prosecution.3
In fact, very few states had religious exemption statutes before
1974,32 when Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act.3 3 The statute created the National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect to provide federal financial assistance to state, lo-
cal, and voluntary agencies and organizations to strengthen their ca-
pacities for developing anti-child abuse and anti-child neglect
programs and treatment centers. 4 The statute itself did not mention a
spiritual treatment exemption. However, regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) required
states receiving federal financial assistance to include a religious ex-
ception in their definitions of "harm or threatened harm to a child's
health or welfare":35
[A] parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious be-
liefs who thereby does not provide specified medical treatment
for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negli-
gent parent or guardian; However, such an exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering that medical services be pro-
vided to the child where his health requires it0 6
After the Act was amended,37 the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS, successor to HEW) issued new regulations in 1983. In
31. Id. at 246-47; see also State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904) (agreeing with
the rationale of Pierson); Owens v. State, 116 P. 345 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911) (following
Pierson and upholding conviction). These cases preceded Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (applying Free Exercise Clause to states through Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment). For a later case, see Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684, 690 (Md. 1959)
(citing Pierson and upholding conviction for involuntary manslaughter against a free exer-
cise defense but remanding for further proceedings; no exemption statute at issue).
32. According to Rita Swan, only 11 states had religious exemption laws in 1974; she
attributes the HEW regulation, infra note 35, to pressure from the Christian Science
Church. See SwAN, LAw's RESPONSE, supra note 4, at 26-27. For other discussions of the
legislative history of the federal regulations and state exemption statutes, see Monopoli,
supra note 3, at 330-34; Treene, supra note 5, at 141-42.
33. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101).
34. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,936, at 43,937 (1974) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-1). The
regulation has since been modified and now provides that the Center's purpose is "to assist
agencies and organizations at the national, State and community levels in their efforts to
improve and expand child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment activities." 45
C.F.R. § 1340.1(a) (1992).
35. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1974) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1)).
36. Id. The language was taken from H.R. Rep. No. 685, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2767.
37. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-266 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1501).
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reaction to comments, the revised regulations expanded the definition
of "negligent treatment or maltreatment" to include "failure to pro-
vide adequate medical care."38 Additionally, in light of Congress' fail-
ure to mention a religious exemption specifically, as well as comments
and objections received by the agency, the Secretary concluded that
there was no legal support for the exception requirement and with-
drew it.39 The regulation now reads as follows:
Nothing in this Part should be construed as requiring or prohib-
iting a finding of negligent treatment or maltreatment when a
parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not, for that
reason alone, provide medical treatment for a child; provided,
however, that if such a finding is prohibited, the prohibition
shall not limit the administrative or judicial authority of the
State to insure that medical services are provided to the child
when his health requires it.'
Despite the 1983 changes in the federal regulations, only three states
have since repealed their religious exemptions.41
In 1984 the Act was amended once more.42 Although HHS, in
amending its rules thereafter, did not solicit comments about the rela-
tionship between the requirement of adequate medical care and pa-
rental reliance on spiritual treatment, the Department noted that
"almost one half of the comment letters" related to this subject.43
Some advocated a federal requirement that states repeal their reli-
gious exemption statutes in order to remain eligible for assistance,44
38. 48 Fed. Reg. 3,698, at 3,699 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)).
39. Id. at 3,700 ("Thus, States are free to recognize or not recognize a religious excep-
tion without that choice having any effect on eligibility for a State child abuse grant.").
40. Id. at 3,702 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(ii)). The same language
now appears at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii) (1992).
41. See HAw. Rlv. STAT. § 350-4 (Supp. 1992) (repealing exemption); S. 219, 178th
Gen. Ct., 1993 Mass. Sess. (Dec. 28, 1993) (striking sentence containing exemption from
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1990)). Compare S.D. CODmED LAws ANN.
§ 26-8A-2(4) (1992) with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6 (1984) (change in the regula-
tory definition shows that the exemption was repealed). See also Effort Seeks to Force
Child Medical Care Regardless of Beliefs, L.A. TimEs, Nov. 27, 1993, at B4.
It should be noted that as of January 1994, the Massachusetts legislature was consider-
ing bills which might reverse the repeal. See H.R. 1529, 179th Gen. Ct., Mass. Sess. (Jan 5,
1994) (protecting traditional religions from governmentally-sanctioned constraints); H.B.
2630, 179th Gen. Ct., Mass. Sess. (Jan. 5, 1994) (proposing a constitutional amendment
prohibiting laws relating to the establishment of religions).
42. The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1501).
43. 52 Fed. Reg. 3,990 at 3,993 (1987).
44. Id. (noting that some "commenters thought that some children from families prac-
ticing spiritual or faith healing are being denied equal protection of their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution").
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but the Department chose to maintain the Reagan Administration's
"regulatory philosophy... to provide maximum State and local flexi-
bility"45 and left its prior wording in place. Thus, despite indications
of public concern about the welfare of children whose parents rely on
spiritual treatment, federal policy remains permissive with respect to
state accommodation statutes.
H. Free Exercise Values: Are Spiritual Treatment Exemption
Statutes a Required Accommodation?
A. The Question in Context: The Accommodation Debate
Religion clause jurisprudence has provoked lively debate for a
number of years, much of it stemming from the perceived clash be-
tween the protection inherent in the Free Exercise Clause and the
prohibition against religious favoritism in the Establishment Clause.46
With respect to governmental accommodation of religious beliefs and
practices, the scholarship presents a broad range of views.
At one extreme, the position of formal neutrality, originally
enunciated by Philip Kurland and currently represented by Mark
Thshnet, interprets the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses to-
gether to mean that "'religion may not be used as a basis for classifica-
tion for purposes of governmental action."' 47 In other words,
government simply may not take special account of religion in formu-
lating its policies.4 8 The only question that can legitimately be asked
45. Id. In the Department's view, a state's Child Protective Services agency "has the
responsibility to investigate and decide what constitutes 'adequate medical care'; what
types of care are acceptable; and what constitutes harm or substantial risk of harm to the
child's health or welfare" (thereby triggering reporting requirements and a need for inter-
vention by the CPS agency). Id. at 3994. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(3) (1992).
46. One scholar has characterized the problem as "a first amendment jurisprudence
that simultaneously calls for special deference to religion under the free exercise clause
and a prohibition of special deference under the establishment clause." William P. Mar-
shall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 357, 358-59 (1989-90). See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1980)
(examining the tension between the two clauses); TRIBE, supra note 22, at 1154 ("[T]he
religion clauses, which for the Framers represented relatively clear statements of highly
compatible goals, have taken on new and varied meanings that frequently appear to con-
flict. The tensions thus created between the two clauses represent a major theme through-
out this chapter.").
47. Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited,
1989 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 373, 373 (quoting Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961)).
48. In Tishnet's words, "It followed directly from Kurland's analysis [advocated by
Tushnet] that exempting the activities of religious believers from generally applicable regu-
lations, solely because of their beliefs, was impermissible." Id. at 377.
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about the effect of governmental action on religious practice amounts
to one of equal protection;49 the Free Exercise Clause does not man-
date accommodation to religious practices,5" and the Establishment
Clause positively prohibits it.51 Thus, under the formal neutrality the-
ory, there is no room for a concept of "permissible accommodation"
to conduct which is specifically religious in nature.52
Other scholars, such as Ellis West5 3 and William Marshall,5 4 ar-
gue that the Free Exercise Clause does not require any particular ex-
emptions from general regulations55 but does leave room for
legislative accommodations, at least under certain circumstances. 56
49. Id. at 373 (quoting Kurland, supra note 47, at 5); see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Reli-
gion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHio ST. L.J. 89, 102-10 (1990) (religion
clauses should be analogized to equal protection doctrine); cf. Michael A. Paulsen, Reli-
gion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NoTmn DAME L. REv. 311, 315 (1986) (utilizing equal protection princi-
ples to arrive at a much more accommodationist approach than ishnet's, supra note 47, or
Marshall's, infra). For a more focused kind of "equality" approach, see Robert D. Kamen-
shine, Scrapping Strict Scrutiny in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CoNsT. Comm. 147, 154 (1987)
(arguing that free exercise and freedom of speech should be analyzed in essentially the
same manner, i.e., where conduct is involved, the Court should use the "substantial govern-
mental interest" standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)); William P.
Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MNN. L.
REv. 545, 546-47 (1983) (arguing, partly on equal protection grounds, that "freedom of
expression and free exercise provide a unitary protection for individual liberty," thereby
calling for the same analysis with respect to both religious and secular ideas). Marshall,
however, is not as thoroughgoing as Tushnet, supra note 47; Marshall would leave room for
legislative accommodations, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
50. fIhshnet, supra note 47, at 377-83.
51. Id. at 384-96.
52. Id.
53. Ellis West, The Case Against A Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NorRE
DAME J.L. Emnics & PUB. POL'y 591 (1990).
54. Marshall, supra note 46; Marshall, supra note 49.
55. Marshall, supra note 46, at 386 ("The constitutional difficulties created by special
protection for religion militate against the conclusion that special treatment for religion is
constitutionally compelled."); Marshall, supra note 49, at 593 ("Any judicially created ex-
emption granted to those expressing a religious interest may be constitutionally required
only when such an exemption would be similarly required for those expressing parallel free
speech claims."); West, supra note 53, at 600-13 (presenting six arguments against religion-
based exemptions, three of which apply to either legislative or court action); see also
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 78, 166-85
(1990) (arguing for the elimination of the accommodation principle).
56. Marshall, supra note 46, at 398-400 (permissible legislative accommodation does
not violate the Establishment Clause); Marshall, supra note 49, at 583-84 (noting "difficult
problems even with legislative accommodation" but stating that "[I]egislative accommoda-
tion, however, is a wholly different question than the question of judicially created exemp-
tions . . . . A congressional decision to favor religion that does not violate the
establishment clause simply means that all religious favoritism is not prohibited by the
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Ira Lupu's position,5 7 on the other hand, is a mirror image of West's
and Marshall's; he maintains that the Free Exercise Clause requires
some accommodations from government,58 but he opposes legislative
exemptions on Establishment Clause and policy grounds.59 In his
view, courts are the appropriate governmental bodies for drawing the
requisite constitutional lines.6 °
Finally, the "accommodationist" position, represented most vo-
cally by Douglas Laycock6' and Michael McConnell, 62 advocates a
constitutional interpretation often characterized as "substantive neu-
trality. ' 63 This position views some religion-based exemptions to gen-
eral regulations as required by free exercise principles64 and leaves
Constitution."); West, supra note 53, at 634-36 (with the qualification, id. at 635 n.185, that
"[s]uch exemptions ... should be given only in cases where the hardship for which an
exemption would provide relief was caused by the government in the first place. Other-
wise, the principle of neutrality could be used to justify forms of direct aid to religion per
se."). The Marshall/West viewpoint is basically that taken by Justice Scalia in his opinion
for the Court in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Oregon to exempt sacramen-
tal peyote use from its general criminal statute prohibiting the use of certain controlled
substances). That case has now been ostensibly overruled by the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
57. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discre-
tionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1991) [hereinafter Lupu,
Reconstructing]; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv.
743 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, Trouble].
58. Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 57, at 561-64; Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at
754-62.
59. Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 57, at 580-99; Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at
776-80 & n.166.
60. Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 57, at 600-06; Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at
780.
61. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality To-
ward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality]; Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1 [hereinafter Laycock,
Remnants].
62. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv.
1 [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation]; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685 (1992)
[hereinafter McConnell, Update].
63. Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at 744-45, 745 n.7, 772 (referring to McConnell's
perspective and Laycock's position as "substantive [religious] neutrality"); see also Lay-
cock, Neutrality, supra note 61, at 1001 (offering as a definition, "the religion clauses re-
quire government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance"); Lay-
cock, Remnants, supra note 61, at 13-17; McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 62, at 8-
13; McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at 729.
64. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 61, at 1014-16; Laycock, Remnants, supra note 61,
at 13-21; McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 62, at 5 (declining, however, to explore
the distinction between mandatory and permissible accommodations); McConnell, Update,
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broad room for permissible accommodations before the boundaries
imposed by the Establishment Clause are reached.65
A full exploration of the broad range of philosophical debate re-
volving around the concept of permissible accommodation is beyond
the scope of this Article. The argument here is that even from an
accommodationist standpoint, statutory exemptions from child abuse
and neglect laws for religiously motivated parents are not required by
the Free Exercise Clause. Where they exist, they violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
There is no tenable argument that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment requires an exemption for parents whose behavior
would be characterized as medical child neglect absent their religious
motivation; nor does the Free Exercise Clause provide a defense when
religiously motivated parents are prosecuted for such crimes as man-
slaughter or child endangerment.6 6 State courts have almost univer-
sally rejected free exercise claims in this context, whether or not the
legislature has enacted a statutory exemption.67 Although the United
supra note 62, at 687; see also GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FiRsT FREEDOM: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER 134 (1993) (arguing that the
Free Exercise Clause creates substantive constitutional rights which protect "the right to
engage in religious conduct associated with religious faith, even if such behavior... neces-
sitates an exemption from civil and criminal laws" of general applicability).
65. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 61, at 1016; Laycock, Remnants, supra note 61, at
11-15, 68; McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 62, at 29-34; McConnell, Update, supra
note 62, at 687-88 ("The accommodationist position ... holds that accommodations are
sometimes required and, within rigorous limitations ... are always permitted."); see also
Choper, supra note 46, at 685-89 (accommodation of religion is permissible so long as there
is no coercion, compromise, or influence); Richard J. Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious
Freedom, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 620 (1992) (religious freedom is an end in itself; Estab-
lishment Clause is not interpreted); STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PosITVE NEUTRALITY: LET-
TING RELIGIOUs FREEDOM RING 195 (1993) (agreeing with accommodationists' emphasis
on religion's important role and that strict neutrality essentially supports "antireligious sec-
ularism"); cf. Marshall, supra note 46, at 411 ("[lit is not anti-religious secularism to con-
tend that the Constitution protects only freedom of religion and that the protection of
religion itself.., is only derivative.").
66. For general arguments against the idea that the Free Exercise Clause requires any
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct, see generally Gey, supra note 55; Marshall,
supra note 46; Thshnet, supra note 47, at 377-83; West, supra note 53.
67. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
905 (1989); People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1667, 1688-89 (1991); State v. Che-
*noweth, 71 N.E. 197, 199 (Ind. 1904) (no statutory exemption); Craig v. State, 155 A.2d
684, 689-90 (Md. 1959) (note that no statutory exemption was at issue here); People v.
Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 246-47 (N.Y. 1903) (no statutory exemption); Owens v. State, 116 P.
345, 346-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911) (no statutory exemption); Commonwealth v. Barn-
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States Supreme Court has not reviewed any of the relevant cases,68
the Court's jurisprudence supports the state courts' views.
1. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Require the Exemption
It is axiomatic that, although the Free Exercise Clause protects
belief absolutely, religiously motivated conduct "remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. ' 69 In only a handful of cases
has the Supreme Court found that the Free Exercise Clause, standing
alone, commands an exception to otherwise applicable government
policy.70 Indeed, in Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith,71 Justice Scalia noted, "We have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate. '72
Even during its apparently brief tenure,7 3 the widely criticized7 4
Smith analysis would not have governed a case challenging the consti-
hart, 497 A.2d 616, 620-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988); State v.
Norman, 808 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
68. Walker, 491 U.S. at 905 (cert. denied); Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63
(Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1992); Barnhart, 488 U.S. at 817 (cert. denied).
69. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (applying the Free Exercise
Clause to the states); see also, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
70. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl.
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 398.
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72. Id. at 878-79. The case held that a criminal law of general applicability would
violate the Free Exercise Clause only if it were specifically targeted at a religious practice
per se. Id. at 877-78.
73. The Smith holding has ostensibly been superseded by the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993), but that fact does not
make Justice Scalia's observation any less germane. The Act specifically finds that "in
Employment Division v. Smith... the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion." Section 2(a)(4) (citation omitted). The Act also states Congress' purpose "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened." Section 2(b)(b) (citations omitted). See also infra notes 96-111 and
accompanying text (discussing the Act).
74. James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 115
(1991) ("Smith essentially rendered the Free Exercise Clause a dead letter."); id. at 116
("By transparently manipulating both precedent and logic, the Court succeeded in abdicat-
ing its constitutional duty to enforce the Free Exercise Clause."); Laycock, Remnants,
supra note 61, at 36 (Smith "fundamentally changed the law of free exercise without briefs
or argument, in an abstract case created by the Court"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note
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tutionality of spiritual treatment exemption statutes. These laws fit
into a category of decisions favoring claimants to an exemption: those
which "have involved.., the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as ... the right of parents, ac-
knowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters... to direct the education of
their children.... .,75 Religious education and inculcation of parental
religious values, paramount in Pierce and Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 6 are, of
course, implicated in the spiritual treatment of ill children as well.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has specifically protected the rights
of parents to make medical decisions on behalf of their minor
children.7
7
Nonetheless, the existence of a constitutional right, whether pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause,7 8 or a
57, at 609 ("Smith is... profoundly wrong on both substantive and institutional grounds.");
Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at 771 ("I... reject Smith on every level."); Harry F. Tepker,
Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 27
(1991) (Smith "demotes previously protected free exercise rights from the categorical sta-
tus of 'fundamental rights' to the lesser level of 'liberty interests"'); IVERS, supra note 64,
at 158 (the Smith Court "decided that administrative convenience and political deference
to lawmaking bodies were more important principles to uphold than enforcing constitu-
tional protection for an enumerated constitutional right"); MONSMA, supra note 65, at 224
(the Court's opinion "is destructive of religious freedom in a major way"); see generally
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1109 (1990) (arguing against Smith's use of legal sources and its theoretical argu-
ment). But see Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Lan-
guage of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 672, 683-84 (1992) (arguing that Smith's
effect on religious liberty may be more limited than initially considered); Marshall, supra
note 46, at 386-412 (arguing against religious based exemptions); William P. Marshall, In
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 309 (1991) (de-
fending "Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions"); West,
supra note 53, at 623-33 (arguing that there is no constitutionally compelled right to reli-
gious exemptions).
75. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). Pierce upheld the right of parents to send their
children to private schools, including religiously affiliated schools, in lieu of statutorily re-
quired public education.
76. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. The holding in Yoder was based in
large part on the grounds that participation in public high school life undermined tradi-
tional Amish values and training in their children. See id. at 218.
77. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding a statute permitting parents to
commit their minor children to state mental hospitals under voluntary commitment proce-
dures); see infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
78. Cases protecting the rights of persons to make certain decisions about the conduct
of their personal and family lives, including the right to make personal medical decisions,
generally trace the constitutional origins of such rights to the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
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combination of the two, simply means that government must assert a
compelling state interest and impose a restriction appropriately tai-
lored to serve its ends.79 The health and welfare of children has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a state interest of the highest order, permitting
intervention by the machinery of government whenever that welfare
has been deemed to be threatened. Thus, the common law concept of
parens patriae0 permits the state to interyene in parental decision-
making potentially harmful to a minor child. 1 The Supreme Court
has recognized the state's right to restrict otherwise constitutionally
protected parental decisionmaking when a child's welfare is at stake.
Characterizing the state's parens patriae powers, the Court specifically
noted in Prince v. Massachusetts' that "[t]he right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.""3 Uphold-
ing the application of child labor laws against a Jehovah's Witness
whose nine-year-old ward (her niece) helped her to distribute reli-
gious literature pursuant to their religious beliefs, the Court made this
classic statement:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.8 4
Following this reasoning, Wisconsin v. Yoder"5 observed that "the
power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
79. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-95 and cases cited therein (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course,
does not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct.... Instead, we have
respected both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the governmental in-
terest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial bur-
den on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.") (citations omitted); see generally, TRIBE, supra note 22,
§ 16-33, at 1610-13 (discussing in general strict scrutiny of cases involving fundamental
rights); id. § 14-13, at 1251 (discussing government's burden when claimant demonstrates
intrusion on free exercise rights).
80. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
81. See generally CLARK, supra note 29, § 9.3, at 335-39 (discussing concept as applied
to medical decisionmaking, including cases of religiously motivated parental objection to
conventional medical care).
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. Id. at 166-67.
84. Id. at 170.
85. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child ....
2. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Provide a Defense
State courts have consistently rejected defenses to criminal ac-
tions based on free exercise claims.' Citing Prince, the California
Supreme Court characterized the lives and health of children as "an
interest of unparalleled significance""8 and stated, "Regardless of the
severity of the religious imposition, the governmental interest is
plainly adequate to justify its restrictive effect." 9 On that basis, the
court upheld the denial of a Christian Scientist's motion to dismiss
charges of involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment
under circumstances where her four-year-old daughter died of acute
meningitis after having been treated solely with prayer.90 The court
held that neither the Constitution nor the state's religious exemption
statute protected parents whose children's lives were threatened by
serious illness.91 Similar reasoning has been used countless times by
state courts ordering blood transfusions or other medical treatment
over parental objections based on religious grounds92 and by the
United States Supreme Court when placing its imprimatur on univer-
sal immunization requirements. 93
Definitions of child abuse and neglect are generally regulatory in
nature and do not require the endangerment of children's lives before
they become applicable, 94 but this does not distinguish them from the
cited cases. The very premise of an abuse or neglect statute is that
parental rights do not encompass certain types of behavior and that
parental duties necessarily require others. The reasoning of the cases
clearly indicates that when society is dealing with an issue as impor-
tant as the appropriate definition of child abuse or child neglect, the
86. Id. at 233-34.
87. See cases cited supra note 67.
88. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989).
89. Id. at 870.
90. See David G. Savage, High Court Permits Prosecution in Faith-Healing Death, L.A.
Tmms, June 20, 1989, at 16; Nat Hentoff, The Death of a Christian Science Child, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 3, 1988, at A25.
91. Walker, 763 P.2d at 871 ("The imposition of criminal liability is reserved for the
actual loss or endangerment of a child's life and thus is narrowly tailored to those instances
when governmental intrusion is absolutely compelled."). Accord see cases cited supra note
9.
92. See cases cited supra note 14.
93. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
94. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Free Exercise Clause, even when paired with constitutionally pro-
tected parental rights, cannot be construed to require an exemption
from statutes protecting the health and welfare of children.
3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 Does Not Change
the Outcome: Further Analysis Under the "Compelling
Governmental Interest" and "Least Restrictive
Means" Tests95
Predicated upon findings that a "neutral" law96 may substantially
burden free exercise rights97 and that Smith was wrongly decided,9"
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 specifically restores
"the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wis-
consin v. Yoder"99 and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
95. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993). The textual discussion herein assumes the constitutionality of the statute, which
may be open to question. The First Amendment, unlike the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth, contains no enabling clause permitting Congress to carry out its purposes and
provisions. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. X1V, § 5; amend. XIV, § 2.
Therefore, Congress' attempt to override the Supreme Court's interpretation of religion
clause requirements by enacting a more expansive definition of free exercise receives no
direct support from such cases as Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
(upholding various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, although the Act was
predicated upon more expansive views of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
provided broader remedies than the Court itself had deemed constitutionally necessary).
96. Elimination of spiritual treatment exemption clauses from child abuse and neglect
statutes would, of course, make them "neutral" laws.
97. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(a)(2), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) ("Laws 'neutral' toward reli-
gion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise."); id. at § 2(a)(3) ("Governments should not substantially burden religious exer-
cise without compelling justification.").
98. Id. at § 2(a)(4) ("In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.").
99. Id. at § 2(b)(1) (citations omitted). Another purpose is "to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." Id.
at § 2(b)(2). In light of the Act's stated purpose to reinstate the holdings of Sherbert and
Yoder, this discussion assumes that the Act simply restores pre-Smith law: i.e., that the Act
should not be read more broadly than one would read the holdings of the cases it cites, see
Restore Freedom of Religion, Editorial, ST. Louis Posr-DisPATcH, Oct. 27, 1993, at 6B
("That test [the compelling interest test required by the Act] had been in place for many
years and had worked well until the Supreme Court weakened it in 1990."). But see Bruce
Fein, There's Mischief in This Law, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1993, at 12A ("The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act subverts the rule of law by overindulgence of a good thing-
freedom of religious practice" and expressing the view that under the broad statute almost
any behavior, including crimes, could be excused); Howard A. Peters III, Caution on
Prison Religious Freedom, CH. TRm., Nov. 1, 1993, at Perspective 18 (claiming an earlier
editorial had "incorrectly" claimed that restoration of prior law was the Act's only effect
and expressing the fear that "[t]he act, if unamended, will place a significant burden on
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(a) IN GENERAL.-Govemment shall not substantially bur-
den a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in sub-
section (b).
(b) EXCEPTION.-Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that applica-
tion of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.100
As one of the Act's specific purposes is "to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened
by government,"'' advocates will surely argue that the constitutional
interpretation mandated by the statute requires upholding spiritual
treatment exemptions. As the Act specifically incorporates the Yoder
holding,10 2 however, resolution of this contention depends upon an
interpretation of that case and other consistent decisions. The preced-
ing discussion of free exercise jurisprudence' 0 3 demonstrates not only
the compelling nature of the state's interest in the health and welfare
of children but the boundaries placed upon Yoder's reach "if it ap-
pears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child."' 04
While the health and welfare of children may indisputably consti-
tute a "compelling governmental interest," in the words of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act,0 5 proponents of spiritual treatment
exemption statutes will doubtless argue that total elimination of the
accommodation-whether by invalidation under the Constitution or
by legislative repeal-fails to meet the Act's standard of "the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est."'0 6 After all, when an individual case demands it, there is the
possibility of a governmental check-usually in the form of a judicial
order for medical treatment. 10 7 This practice is expressly stipulated in
correctional operations and interfere with prison officials' ability to protect persons who
are housed and work in this dangerous environment.").
100. Pub. L. No. 103-141, §§ 3(a), 3(b)(1)(2), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
101. Id. at § 2(b)(2).
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
105. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(b)(1), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). This standard is required by
the Act before government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion. See
supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
106. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(b)(2).
107. See supra note 14 and cases cited therein.
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most statutes'08 and, in any event, required by federal regulations.109
An individualized procedure is surely a less restrictive burden upon
religious exercise than is a blanket requirement that those who believe
in spiritual treatment alone must provide conventional medical care
for their children where a failure to do so by non-religiously motivated
parents would be deemed abuse or neglect.
The answer to this contention is simply that individualized mech-
anisms for protecting children too often do not work. Statistics show
that at least forty children in the last decade have died as a result of
diseases treatable by conventional medical care.1 0 It is important to
remember that these are only the cases which have come to the atten-
tion of courts after discovery by governmental authorities and deci-
sions to prosecute;"' surely, there are countless others. Finally, a
recital of deaths does not begin to measure the preventable debilitat-
ing effects on life-long health suffered by children who do not receive
adequate medical care; the numbers involved are matters about which
we can only speculate. The total elimination of these exemptions
from the statute books, resulting in child abuse and neglect laws of
uniform applicability, is the only means for protecting the health and
welfare of all children.
108. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also statutes cited supra note 13.
109. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
111. District Attorneys may often decline to prosecute. Prosecutions have proven diffi-
cult and often unsuccessful because, so long as the exemptions are in place, there are sub-
stantial due process arguments in defendants' favor. See cases cited supra note 8
(prosecutions disallowed on due process grounds, usually deemed to be lack of notice of
criminality of failure to obtain conventional medical care once the child's condition be-
came life-threatening); see also Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Crimi-
nal Liability, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 559, 584 (1990) (statutes fail "to give citizens clear
guidelines for legal conduct"); John T. Gathings, Jr., Comment, When Rights Clash: The
Conflict Between a Parent's Right to Free Exercise of Religion Versus His Child's Right to
Life, 19 CumB. L. R~v. 585, 608-14 (1988-89) (statutes would achieve a deterrent effect if
they "were amended so as to clearly proscribe the conduct at issue, giving parents the
opportunity to be truly informed as to the consequences" of their actions); Gekas, supra
note 5, at 415-18 (parents must be on notice); Elizabeth R. Koller, Comment, Walker v.
Superior Court.: Religious Convictions May Bring Felony Convictions, 21 PAC. LJ. 1069,
1100-01 (1990) (Walker is ambiguous as to when spiritual treatment becomes criminally
punishable); Monopoli, supra note 3, at 351 (exemptions operate to "thwart justice and
endanger children"); Scheiderer, supra note 3, at 1441-43 ("Vague laws violate due process
rights by chilling the exercise of protected freedoms."); Trahan, supra note 4, at 337 &
n.238 (statutes "are open to constitutional challenges for vagueness under the Due Process
Clause"); Treene, supra note 5, at 165-76 (statutory language cannot deprive defendants of
notice).
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IlL Spiritual Treatment Exemptions as Violations of the
Establishment Clause
A. The Current Establishment Clause "Tests"
If spiritual treatment exemptions are not required by the Free
Exercise Clause or by any likely interpretation of the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, the next logical question is whether they consti-
tute a "law respecting an establishment of religion.""" Several courts
have expressed the view that they do." Strong arguments support
this position under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, which today
revolves principally around the "Lemon test" and Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement test.""' 4 While finding spiritual treatment exemptions
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 575 & n.1 (Colo. 1991) (trial court held sua
sponte that a spiritual treatment exemption limited to a particular sect violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 69 n.9 (Minn. 1991) (the court found
the establishment argument "persuasive," although it decided the case on other grounds);
State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) (prayer treatment ex-
emption violates Establishment Clause); accord Trahan, supra note 4, at 339 & n.249.
114. This Article does not weigh the issue at hand under Justice Kennedy's proposed
third alternative, the "coercion test." Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]ithout exception we have
invalidated actions that further the interests of religion through the coercive power of gov-
ernment .... The freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference or
oppression is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses.
Barring all attempts to aid religion through government coercion goes far toward attain-
ment of this object."). Conceding that "our recent cases reject the view that coercion is the
sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation," Justice Kennedy countered that
"Itihat may be true if by 'coercion' is meant direct coercion .... " But by "coercion" he
would include indirect behavior that "would place the government's weight behind an ob-
vious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion." Id. at 660-61. Although Jus-
tice Kennedy spoke for four Justices in his Allegheny opinion, his views were vigorously
opposed by the other five Justices, whose analysis revolved generally around an "endorse-
ment" concept; see infra note 151 and accompanying text; id. at 602-13 (Blackmun, J., in an
opinion of the Court) (finding that "Justice Kennedy's reasons [for a differing analysis] ...
are so far reaching in their implications that they require a response in some depth," and
noting that "Justice Kennedy's effort to abandon the 'endorsement' inquiry in favor of his
'proselytization' test seems nothing more than an attempt to lower considerably the level
of scrutiny in Establishment Clause cases," and characterizing Justice Kennedy's analysis
as "flawed at its foundation"); id. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens,
JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("An Establishment Clause stan-
dard that prohibits only 'coercive' practices or overt efforts at government proselytization,
but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle ways that government can show
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in
my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the
members of our pluralistic political community.") (citation omitted); see also id. at 650 n.6
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Justice Kennedy's preferred 'coercion' test... is, as he himself admits, out of step with
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to be violations of the Establishment Clause under either test, this
Part suggests that the tests themselves are unsatisfactory measures for
evaluating a religious exemption from an otherwise generally applica-
ble regulation.
B. The Lemon Test
Although much maligned by both scholars115 and the Justices
themselves, 116 and apparently scheduled for re-examination this
our precedent.") (citing and quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)). In Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), Justice Kennedy, for the Court, invalidated the practice of
prayer at public school graduations on the basis of the Lemon test, see infra notes 118-19
and accompanying text, specifically noting, "It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise ...." Id. at 2655. He was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter. In a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens
and O'Connor, took pains to note that "[t]he Court repeatedly has recognized that a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion," id. at 2665, and to reiter-
ate the Establishment Clause's prohibition against "endorsement," id. at 2667. Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, followed suit with an elaborate analysis
of why "coercion" is an insufficient test for Establishment Clause analysis, id. at 2671-76,
and an explication of permissible accommodation which relied heavily on "endorsement"
concepts, id. at 2676-78. Thus, the "coercion" test has never gained the support of a major-
ity of the Court and appears unlikely to do so, particularly given the retirement of Justice
White and the appointment of Justice Ginsburg.
115. Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 409, 450 (1986) (Lemon is "[s]o elastic in its application that it means everything and
nothing"); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of Establishment Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv.
1373, 1380-1402 (1981) (criticizing second and third prongs of Lemon); Ira C. Lupu, Keep-
ing the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. Rnv. 739,
744-45 (1986) (Lemon test limits legitimate government interests); Lupu, Trouble, supra
note 57, at 762 (Lemon's reign "is about to end"); id. at 762 n.87 ("Academic commenta-
tors have been [persuasively] excoriating Lemon for years .. "); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI.
L. REv. 115, 118-19 (1992) (the "aptly named Lemon" doctrine is in "chaos"); Paulsen,
supra note 49, at 315-17 (case law is inconsistent with Lemon test); Gary J. Simson, The
Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CoNEL
L. Rnv. 905, 908-35 (1987) (criticizing all three prongs of Lemon); MONSMA, supra note 65,
at 29 (Court has not consistently applied Lemon); see generally Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt,
Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44
MERCER L. Rav. 881 (1993).
116. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Persuasive criticism
of Lemon has emerged.") (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Mary-
land Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment));
see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656 ("'[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."') (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)). Although he found Lemon satisfactory for his Alle-
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term,1 1 7 the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman"18 remains the
Court's dominant model for determining whether the Establishment
Clause has been violated: "First, the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not fos-
ter 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 19
1. Purpose
Any governmental accommodation directed exclusively to the
benefit of religious actors poses obvious problems for the purpose
prong of the Lemon test. Justice White acknowledged this dilemma in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 2 ' which upheld the ex-
emption of religious employers from Title VII's religious nondiscrimi-
nation provision. Nonetheless, he declared the exemption "in no way
questionable under the Lemon analysis."' 21 His opinion for the Court
found that under Lemon it was a permissible legislative purpose "to
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of reli-
gious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions."' 22
Presumably, a statute whose purpose was to alleviate significant gov-
ernmental interference with the ability of individual religious actors to
follow their religious precepts would also pass muster under Lemon.
2. Effects
It is the second Lemon prong, the "primary effects test," that
presents the greatest problems for accommodations aimed exclusively
at religious actors. In Amos, Justice White explained away the prob-
gheny analysis, Justice Kennedy conceded that "[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment
Clause doctrine may be in order ... ." Id. at 656.
117. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist:, 618 N.E.2d 94, (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 62 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 30, 1993), specifically raises the question of whether the
Lemon test should be overruled; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will Hear Church-
State Case Involving Hasidim, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 30, 1993, at Al (noting, however, that the
Justices will not "necessarily accept" the invitation to "rewrite the constitutional law of
church and state"). The case challenges a New York statute creating a public school dis-
trict coterminous with an enclave of Hasidic Jews in order to provide handicapped school
children with public educational services when their parents refused on religious grounds
to send their children to surrounding schools in order to obtain the benefits. Relying on
the Lemon test as interpreted by "endorsement" concepts, the New York State Court of
Appeals declared the law unconstitutional.
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. Id. at 612-13 (quoting WaIz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
120. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
121. Id. at 335.
122. Id.
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lem by stating that "[flor a law to have forbidden 'effects' under
Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced
religion through its own activities and influence."'" He cited Walz v.
Tax Commission 24 for the proposition that, to the Framers, "'estab-
lishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.""' 12  Other
Justices were more cognizant of the advancement of religion effected
by the religious exemption in Amos, but concurred in the judgment on
the grounds that a different policy would have a chilling effect on free
exercise activity126 or that the government policy stopped short of
"endorsement."127
Spiritual treatment exemptions to child neglect laws obviously
provide a benefit to religious actors that is unavailable to others,
thereby preferring religion over nonreligion. Indeed, they benefit one
particular religious viewpoint-that spiritual treatment alone is a suf-
ficient means of healing physical ailment. Although some Establish-
ment Clause cases imply that either of these kinds of preferences is
sufficient to invalidate governmental action,12' Amos and other cases
indicate that this is not necessarily so, at least not when government
123. Id. at 337.
124. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
125. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
126. Id. at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting "'by definition, such
legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion"')
(quoting her own concurrence in the judgment in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985)
and stating that the question should be "'whether government's purpose is to endorse reli-
gion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement"'); id. at 348
(quoting her opinion in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69). For a discussion of the "endorsement"
test, see infra notes 147-72 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun essentially agreed
with Justice O'Connor's position. Amos, 483 U.S. at 346 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
128. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 644 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We have.., interpreted... [the
Establishment] Clause to require neutrality, not just among religions, but between religion
and nonreligion."); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-53 ("[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded
that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all."); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244
(1982) ("The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomi-
nation cannot be officially preferred over another."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
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policy itself has imposed a burden on religiously motivated
behavior.2 9
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never defined "primary
effect" in any meaningful manner, although Justice O'Connor's "en-
dorsement" concept, discussed below, °30 represents an attempt to do
so. Some cases, particularly those involving public aid to religiously
affiliated schools, suggest a quantitative, kind of perspective: "too
much" aid, even though nonsectarian in nature, helps the sectarian
enterprise as a whole, thereby producing a forbidden primary ef-
fect. 3 ' Other cases focus more specifically on the quality of the gov-
ernment action in evaluating its primary effect: they often decry a
"symbolic link" between church and state or an "imprimatur of ap-
proval" by government action on a religious message.132 With respect
to spiritual treatment exemption statutes, both perspectives apply.
The unconstitutional effect of these laws does not necessarily lie
in their potential for forcing upon minor children their parents' reli-
gious views, for that activity receives at least some degree of support
from parental rights to educate minor children. 33 The forbidden ef-
fect may not even lie in the operation of these exemptions to force
minor children to practice some aspects of their parents' religion. The
129. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases of permissible ac-
commodations to religious actors); see also TRIBE, supra note 22, § 14-7, at 1193 ("One can
say with... confidence that Larson's neutrality principle does not extend to cases where
the state's denominational line is based on free exercise values.").
130. See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 417-18 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[B]y directly assuming part of the parochial schools' education function, the effect of the
... aid is 'inevitably... to subsidize and advance the religious mission of [the] sectarian
schools' even though the program provides that only secular subjects will be taught.")
(quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1973)); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) ("Substantial aid to the educational function of such
schools.., necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole."); cf.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658 (1980) ("The
Court 'has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one
aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends."') (quoting
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
132. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) ("The
symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence children of
tender years . . . ."); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982) ("[TIhe
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a
significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some."); cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263,274 (1981) ("[A]n open forum in a public university does not confer any imprima-
tur of state approval on religious sects or practices.").
133. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text, and infra notes 267-70 and accompa-
nying text (discussing rights of parents to bring up and educate their children as they see
fit).
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reasoning of cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder' might well support par-
ents' rights to compel their minor children (at least those who are very
young) to attend church, engage in supervised religious study, or ab-
stain from dancing or other behavior considered sinful according to
the parents' religious tenets. Rather, the unconstitutional effect of
these exemptions lies in the fact that their operation forces upon mi-
nor children religious practices which may have extremely debilitating
effects upon their lives and health that cannot be undone or overcome
when the children reach maturity -and can make their own religious
choices. As a quantitative matter, the impact on those affected by the
statutes is frequently severe and sometimes permanent. From the
qualitative perspective, the effect is achieved by the government's ele-
vation of the religious practices of certain adults over interests nor-
mally deemed compelling-the lives and welfare of children. 135 In the
process, children's constitutionally protected free exercise and equal
protection rights are ignored.136  Recall the Court's statement in
Prince v. Massachusetts: "Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circum-
stances, to make martyrs of their children .... ,,137 Any law which
specifically authorizes parents to violate this basic principle in the
name of religious freedom has a primary effect which, under the clas-
sic Lemon analysis, is offensive to the Establishment Clause. 38
3. Entanglement
The third Lemon prong is the "entanglement" test, which invali-
dates policies requiring a high degree of interaction between govern-
ment and religious institutions or actors. 39 Some state courts have
134. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
135. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text (arguing that exemption statutes
trample on children's free exercise rights); see also infra notes 251-66 and accompanying
text (arguing that exemption statutes violate children's rights to equal protection of the
laws).
137. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); see also supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
138. Note that the Prince principle anticipates and overcomes the counterargument
pertaining to the chilling effect on the parents' free exercise rights, thereby obviating the
grounds upon which Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in Amos. See supra note
126 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the state's compelling interest in the health and welfare of children).
139. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating New York's program
of sending Title I teachers into religiously affiliated schools on the basis of the extensive
monitoring required to assure that they would not become intertwined with the schools'
religious messages); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down public provision
of auxiliary school supplies, such as audio-visual equipment, to religiously affiliated
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expressed entanglement concerns where the relevant statutes ex-
empted spiritual treatment, provided by members of a "recognized
church,""' conducted "in accordance with the tenets of [that] recog-
nized" group' 4' or under the care of a "duly accredited
practitioner." 42
While a law phrased in general terms, along the lines of the origi-
nal HEW regulation, 43 avoids the obvious pitfalls of denominational
preference or inquiry into religious "accreditation," it encounters a
similar, but subtler, "entanglement" trap. Those who practice spiri-
tual treatment alone may claim that they have met the law's require-
ment of "adequate medical care" for their children; they simply
schools, partly on the grounds that insuring their use for only secular instruction would
require too much monitoring).
140. State v. Miskimes, 490 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1984) (invalidating on
establishment clause grounds an exemption for parents providing prayer treatment alone
"in accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body," noting the government
intrusion raised by questions "such as what is a 'recognized' religious body, by whom must
it be 'recognized,' for how long must it have been 'recognized,' what are its tenets, did the
accused act in accordance with those tenets, what are 'spiritual means,' and what is the
effect of combining some prayer with some treatment or medicine"); see also Walker v.
Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 877 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring, expressing the view
that California's statute violated the Establishment Clause and noting specifically "the
troubling entanglement of church and state" required by statutory language similar to the
Ohio law).
141. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103(1)
(Supp. 1992); IowA ADMiN. CODE r. 18.2-371.1(c) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3608(1)(c) (1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403(B)(4) (West 1986); N.H. REv. STAT.
§ 639:3(IV) (1986); OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-228(2) (Michie 1988); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-7(c) (1992). TWo
state statutes substitute "organized" for "recognized": DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104
(1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1989).
142. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6 (1982); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1992); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(4)(c) (Michie 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-30-103(5)(B) (Michie
1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1993); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West
1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356 (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(8)(f) (1988); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(0 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(8)(D) (Supp. 1993);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010(1), (2) (West Supp. 1992); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
273 § 1(4) (West 1990); Miss. CODE ANN . § 43-21-105(l)(i), (m) (Supp. 1992); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(xix)(c) (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(c) (West 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(L)(5), (M)(4) (Michie Supp. 1992); 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6303
(Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (Supp. 1992).
The statutes of four jurisdictions specifically exempt only Christian Science treatment
administered by a duly accredited Christian Science practitioner. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-201.01 (1989); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1989); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-
546(B) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-104 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-120 (1993); VA. CODE Ar. § 18.2-314 (Michie 1988); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.44.020(3) (1993).
143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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provide a different kind of medical care-not conventional medical
care, perhaps, but medical care (or, at least, "health care") nonethe-
less.144 They may be willing to offer empirical evidence concerning
the effectiveness of their techniques. 45 Yet one enduring principle in
the murky area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that govern-
ment may not inquire into the truth of any religious belief.146
Whether or not the "entanglement" prong of Lemon survives, it
would clearly be unacceptable for a court to delve into the efficacy of
spiritual healing as a means of meeting a statutory requirement of
"adequate medical care."
C. The "Endorsement" Test
A number of commentators' 47 and most of the Justices"48 have
expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, which is obviously ill-
suited to intelligent evaluation of accommodations directed exclu-
sively to religious actors. Justice O'Connor's modification of
Lemon-her "endorsement test"-has drawn increasing attention
from both quarters149 and appears to be a likely point of coalescence
144. See, e.g., Nathan A. Talbot, Government Should Not Interfere With Personal Be-
liefs, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALING FOR CHILDREN 7-
10 (1989). This book, consisting of a collection of essays on various aspects of the Christian
Science position, makes clear that, to members of that group, spiritual healing is "health
care" and is demonstrably effective.
145. See Andrew Skolnick, Christian Scientists Claim Healing Efficacy Equal if Not Su-
perior to That of Medicine, 264 JAMA 1379 (1990) (reporting on Christian Scientists trying
to convince legislatures that the church's form of healing is at least as effective as
medicine); Appendix: An Empirical Analysis of Medical Evidence in Christian Science Tes-
timonies of Healing, 1969-1988, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIILrrY: supra note 144, at 110-
26.
146. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind.
Empl. See. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
147. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2664-67 (1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by
Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 2676-78 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
589-94 (opinion of the Court based on the "endorsement" concept); id. at 623-32
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 637 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 650 n.6
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JI., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (if the "effect" of a
government program "conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated") (citations omitted); see
also Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neu-
trality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 152 (1987)
(proposing that endorsement approach be used to develop concept of liberal neutrality);
Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Estab-
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as the Lemon test comes up for re-consideration. 50 Concurring in the
judgment in Amos, Justice O'Connor noted the inherent deficiencies
of Lemon for answering a religious accommodation question and
elaborated upon her previously announced proposal:
The necessary first step in evaluating an Establishment Clause
challenge to a government action lifting from religious organiza-
tions a generally applicable regulatory burden is to recognize
that such government action does have the effect of advancing
religion. The necessary second step is to separate those benefits
to religion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise
of religion from those that provide unjustifiable awards of assist-
ance to religious organizations. As I have suggested in earlier
opinions, the inquiry framed by the Lemon test should be
"whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and
whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorse-
ment." To ascertain whether the statute conveys a message of
endorsement, the relevant issue is how it would be perceived by
an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the statute.15 1
Presumably, concepts applicable to "religious organizations" are
equally valid for all religiously motivated actors.
Under O'Connor's approach, the relevant questions here are,
first, "whether government's purpose is to endorse religion," and sec-
ond, whether a spiritual treatment exemption "would be perceived by
an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute" to "convey a message of endorse-
ment.' 5  With respect to religious exemptions to child abuse and ne-
glect statutes, the answer to the question of governmental purpose is
arguably the same as under the Lemon analysis: the alleviation of a
lishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REv.
1049 (1986) (advocating adoption of the endorsement test to define government neutral-
ity); William P. Marshall, "We Know it When we See it": The Supreme Court and Establish-
ment, 59 S. CAL- L. REv. 495, 498 (1986) (same); Lawrence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 610-11 (1985). But
see McConnell, supra note 115, at 148 ("endorsement test is not an attractive alternative"
to Lemon); see also infra note 176 and accompanying text.
150. See Beschle, supra note 149, at 152 (discussing why O'Connor's endorsement posi-
tion is "preferable to present law"); Gey, supra note 55, at 111-19 (endorsement test may
gain support of accommodationist Justices and has been adopted by the separationists);
Lupu, Trouble, supra note 57, at 762 (noting that even Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
steadfast adherents to Lemon, "have drifted toward Justice O'Connor's 'endorsement' ap-
proach"); see also cases cited supra note 149.
151. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (citations
omitted); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J, concurring in the judgment); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Amos, 483 U.S. at 348.
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govermment-imposed~burden on a religious practice does not, without
more, necessarily reveal an illicit purpose to endorse that practice.
Strong arguments, however, support an affirmative answer to the
question of whether the accommodation at issue conveys a message of
endorsement to "an objective observer, acquainted with the text, leg-
islative history, and implementation of the statute.' 5 3
The text of child abuse and neglect statutes which contain spiri-
tual treatment exemptions 5 4 reveals a plain purpose to protect the
welfare of children. 5 This goal is achieved by requiring the primary
caretakers of minor children (parents or guardians) to provide them
with "adequate food, clothing, shelter [and] medical care."' 56 Yet the
exemption provides that with respect to one such necessary, medical
care, a parent may opt out of the requirement-or, rather, may substi-
tute spiritual treatment-if religious motivation underlies the choice.
The only check on the parent's potentially abusive or neglectful be-
havior is the stipulation that a court may override the parental deci-
sion in the interests of the child's health' 5 7-a check that will not work
if the child's condition is not brought to a court's attention.
Two aspects of the typical exemption immediately stand out.
First, it directly undercuts the statute's primary purpose of protecting
the health and welfare of children, for the accommodation virtually
ensures that some group of children will not receive the adequate
medical care that the legislature deems necessary to serve its goal.
Exemptions from generally applicable regulations that have passed
constitutional muster or been cited with tacit court approval do not
have this effect.' 8 A spiritual treatment exemption to a child abuse/
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional purpose
behind the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and its amendments).
156. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(i) (1992); see also statutes cited supra notes 1-2 and supra
notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act).
157. See statutes cited supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text (discussing federal requirement).
158. For example, tax exemptions for religious institutions (invariably only one kind of
beneficiary of the relevant exemption statute) do not hinder the government's goal of ob-
taining sufficient revenues; they merely eliminate one potential source of revenue collec-
tion, while preserving a desirable separation between religious and governmental
institutions; see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). A law exempting
conscientious objectors from military service does not undermine Congress' overall pur-
pose of raising an effective army; it actually serves that purpose, as such persons may be of
questionable value as fighting troops. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (1970)
(White, J., dissenting). Statutes permitting the sacramental use of peyote do not hinder
government's efforts to stop illegal drug trafficking, as peyote is not a commonly sought
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neglect statute, directly undercutting the primary purpose of the
larger governmental goal, conveys to an "objective observer" a
message of governmental endorsement of religion under Justice
O'Connor's definition.
A second striking aspect of the exemption is that it preserves the
rights of one party at the expense of another. The parent or guardian
of a minor child, who receives the benefits of the exemption, is not the
person most directly affected by its operation. That person is the
child, whose own religious rights are ignored in the name of her par-
ent's religious freedom and whose health and welfare may be severely
harmed. Other exemptions do not work this way." 9 A legislative en-
actment that puts the imprimatur of the state behind religious choices
made by one person but imposed upon another necessarily sends a
message of endorsement to Justice O'Connor's "objective ob-
recreational drug, and the permitted use is narrowly constricted; see Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911-16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, the federal ex-
emption for the sacramental use of peyote in the Native American Church, 21 C.F.R.
§ 1307.31 (1990), aids the government's overall purpose of preserving the heritage and
ways of life of Native Americans, in many ways threatened in the modem context; see 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) ("protection and preservation of traditional religions of Native Amer-
icans"); 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2905 (West Supp. 1993) (Native American Languages Act).
The Social Security exemption for self-employed Amish does not undermine the federal
program, as the affected group does not receive benefits from the system. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1402(g) (1988). The exemption for religious employers from the religious nondiscrimina-
tion requirements of Title VII with respect to the institutions' nonprofit activities is per-
haps a closer call, but on balance it does not undermine the government's purpose to
eliminate invidious discrimination in the workplace; rather, as in Amos, it promotes the
freedom of religious employers to define their own identities and missions. Amos, 483 U.S.
at 339; see infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text for a more general discussion of gov-
ernment accommodations which have received explicit or tacit Court approval. Although
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is not directly on point here, involving as it did a
Court-fashioned exemption (hence there is no statutory "text" to analyze), it is noteworthy
that the case included a specific finding that permitting Amish parents to withdraw their
children from school after eighth grade did not undermine the state's important interest in
developing an educated and productive citizenry; to the contrary, the continuing training
that Amish children received at home would instill in them skills and values that would
serve them well not only in their own community but also in the larger society, should they
choose to leave the Amish enclave.
159. For example, in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Supreme Court held
that an Amish employer (exempt from the payment of Social Security taxes for himself)
could not refuse to pay Social Security taxes for his employees, even though they were also
Amish. The exemption applied only to the self-employed, and their religious beliefs could
not form a legitimate basis for regulating the activities of others. The Court specifically
noted, "[glranting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to im-
pose the employer's religious faith on the employees." Id. at 261. Similarly, every other
statutory exemption applies only to the choices that the religious actor makes for himself
or herself.
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server."16 This is true notwithstanding the parent/child relationship,
for the child's own religious and equal protection rights are so obvi-
ously ignored161 and the child's interest in adequate medical care so
severely undercut.162
The legislative history of these laws buttresses the appearance of
governmental endorsement. Largely the result of lobbying by af-
fected groups, 63 the statutes were not adopted by many states'64 until
a federal regulation forced the issue, using Congressional purse-
strings.'65 Although the federal regulation has been withdrawn and
many concerned groups and citizens have called for repeal of the ex-
emptions,166 HHS stopped short of requiring repeal, and most states
have left the laws in place. 6 Continuation of a legislative policy
favoring religion, which has demonstrably harmed the children whose
160. Yoder is the only accommodation which provides any kind of parallel to the issues
under discussion here. There, however, the children affected by the Court-fashioned policy
were old enough to entertain their own views on the issue; the only evidence before the
Court on the matter was from a girl who agreed with her parents' choice; and affected
children who later left the Amish community could doubtless overcome any educational
deficiencies they might feel. Nonetheless, Justice Douglas's views cogently point to argua-
ble flaws in the holding. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text (discussing why his
dissent applies with greater urgency to spiritual treatment exemption statutes).
161. See infra notes 237-66 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
163. See SwAN, LAw's REsPONSE, supra note 4, at 26-27 (claiming that the first HEW
regulation, requiring states to adopt the exemption in order to be eligible for federal fund-
ing, came about after a request from the Christian Science Church); supra notes 32-45 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative history); see also Gathings, supra note 111, at 588
(noting arguments made by faith healing parents); Monopoli, supra note 3, at 331 & n.63
(citing the lobbying efforts of the Christian Science Church to include spiritual healing
exemptions from federal child abuse/neglect laws); Skolnick, supra note 145, at 1379 (not-
ing that "the Christian Science Church is trying to persuade state legislatures that its partic-
ular form of healing by prayer is as least as effective as medicine"); RrrA SwAN,
MEMORANDUM To U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABusn AND NEGLEcr, RE: FED-
ERAL POLICY ON RELIGIOUs ExEMPIONs FROM CHILD HEALTH CARE LAWS 1 (1993)
(stating that after the 1974 HEW regulation was passed, "the federal push was coordinated
with Christian Science church lobbying at the state level....").
164. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that only eleven states had such
exemptions prior to adoption of the HEW requirement).
165. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the federal regulation).
166. See supra notes 3, 12 and accompanying text; see also Effort Seeks to Force Child
Medical Care Regardless of Beliefs, L.A. TimEs, Nov. 27, 1993, at B4 (noting increased
efforts by various groups urging repeal, including the National Center for Prosecution of
Child Abuse, a wing of the National District Attorney's Association, and citing attempts at
legislative repeal in Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware, and Kentucky).
167. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history and
the states' response).
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health is supposed to be protected, 68 certainly sends a message of
endorsement to this "objective observer."
After text and legislative history, the third element Justice
O'Connor would consider is the implementation of the statute. 69
Here again, the available statistics of harm to the welfare of substan-
tial numbers of children,' together with the due process problems
pinpointed by appellate courts when parental behavior in reliance on
the exemptions has led to children's deaths,' 7 1 amply demonstrate
both the chaos created by these exemptions and their failure to pro-
tect adequately the health and welfare of children-the primary goal
of child abuse/neglect legislation. Inconsistencies in case outcomes in
situations where children's severe conditions are discovered in time to
employ the judicial check on parental behavior further manifest the
laws' inadequacies. 72 These situations obtain as a direct result of gov-
ernmental permission for parents to force their own religious practices
on their children. The implementation of these exemptions cannot
help but "convey a message of endorsement" to any "objective
observer."
D. The Inadequacies of Current "Tests"
The Lemon test has probably been most successful-or at least
received its most consistent application-as a measure for the validity
of government benefits to religiously affiliated schools or to those at-
tending them.13 It has been much less satisfactory (and sometimes
abandoned altogether) in other contexts."7 As Justice O'Connor
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (containing statistics on prosecutions of
children who have died or barely survived life-threatening situations when their parents
chose spiritual treatment alone for their medical care).
169. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (upholding
public provision of sign language interpreter for student attending sectarian school); Wit-
ters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding public grant
to blind theology student whose handicap made him eligible); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (upholding income tax deductions for parents for certain school expenses, in-
cluding private school tuition); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down pub-
lie provision of audio-visual equipment, maps, globes, and other educational aids to
sectarian schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating
money grants to sectarian schools and tuition reimbursements to students' parents); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. (Levitt I), 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating public funding for
the administration and grading of certain tests and examinations in sectarian schools).
174. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislature's hiring of
chaplain to open sessions with prayer, based on notions of history and tradition); see also
760 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:725
pointed out in her Amos concurrence, it does not work conceptually
for accommodations to religiously motivated behavior.175 On the
other hand, critics justifiably characterize O'Connor's modification,
the "endorsement test," as devoid of specific content and therefore
manipulable. 7 6 Thus, while there are strong arguments under each
test to invalidate spiritual treatment exemption statutes pursuant to
the Establishment Clause, inadequacies in the tests themselves suggest
the desirability of a new framework. To answer the question of
whether any governmental accommodation to religiously motivated
behavior not specifically required by the Free Exercise Clause or by
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is permissible or impermissi-
ble under the Establishment Clause, we should look elsewhere.
IV. The Zone of Permissible Accommodation
A. The Chaos of Current Law
"The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by
no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause."'1 7 7 Although, as noted, some commentators argue
vigorously that so-called "permissible accommodations" are indefen-
sible, either on constitutional or policy grounds,7 8 the Court has con-
tinued to sanction what Professor Laurence Tribe characterizes as a
"zone of permissible accommodation"" 7 9
-accommodations to reli-
gious institutions or to individuals motivated by religious convictions.
In each situation, it is clear that the Free Exercise Clause does not
demand the accommodation, but the Establishment Clause also does
not prohibit it.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding presence of creche as part of large and
varied public holiday display, purporting to apply Lemon but also downplaying the impor-
tance of the test and largely relying on historical examples of approved accommodation).
175. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
176. See Gey, supra note 55, at 113 (there is "an almost unlimited malleability" to the
endorsement test); id. at 119 ("The test is so malleable that it can mean anything; the
results depend on the policy presumptions that are plugged into the objective observer's
calculus."); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 301 (1987) (an endorse-
ment test would "not provide clarity or predictability to establishment jurisprudence"); id.
at 325 (the concept of neutrality used in endorsement analysis "appears to be both irresisti-
ble and yet so indeterminate as to be almost meaningless"); Tushnet, supra note 47, at 397
(arguing that the "no endorsement" test "may simply be incoherent").
177. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (upholding, against Establish-
ment Clause challenge, property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious
properties).
178. See supra notes 47-52, 59 and accompanying text.
179. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 14-7 at 1194.
Spring 1994] RELIGION CLAUSES AND CHILD HEALTH CARE 761
Thus, the Court has specifically upheld exemptions of conscien-
tious objectors from military service;" ° property tax exemptions for
religious organizations with respect to their religious properties;'
8
'
and exemptions of religious employers from the religious nondiscrimi-
nation requirements of Title VII, even with respect to the organiza-
tions' secular nonprofit activities."m It has apparently approved of
statutory exemptions permitting the ritual use of peyote, 8 3 exemp-
tions of self-employed Amish from Social Security taxes,'84 and ex-
emptions from Sunday closing laws for those whose religion requires
them not to work on another day of the week. 85 Other kinds of ac-
commodations upheld in the face of Establishment Clause challenges
have included the provision of bus transportation'8 6 and secular text-
books'" to religiously affiliated schools, "released time" programs for
students to leave school and attend religious instruction during the
schoolday,181 inclusion of religious with secular symbols in holiday dis-
plays,'8 9 and the hiring of chaplains by legislatures to open their ses-
sions with prayer.' 90
The question naturally arises whether statutory exemptions from
child abuse and neglect laws for religiously motivated medical deci-
sionmaking are simply another permissible accommodation to reli-
180. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (dismissing the challenge without
stating a reason); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-54 (1971) (refusing to
extend exemption to one who objected to service only in unjust wars, but affirming the
exemption); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (extending exemption to one
with nontheistic conscientious scruples); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187-88
(1965) (extending exemption to one who disavowed belief in a Supreme Being). For cases
clarifying that these exemptions are not required by the Free Exercise Clause, see Gillette,
401 U.S. at 461 n.23 (citing Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934));
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931).
181. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
182. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
183. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1989) (finding it "not surprising that
a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote
use").
184. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 n.4, 260-61 (1982).
185. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (plurality opinion).
186. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
187. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
188. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
189. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding
display on county property of a menorah and Christmas tree together with a secular "Sa-
lute to Liberty" message while striking down display of an isolated nativity scene); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (upholding municipal display of nativity scene with
secular symbols such as Santa Claus, elves, carolers, and cutout figures of a clown, an ele-
phant, and a teddy bear with a large "Seasons Greetings" banner).
190. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
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gious values in a pluralistic society, at least up to the point where the
decisionmaking pits the child's welfare against her parents' religious
and other rights. Clearly, that is how the administering federal agency
has regarded these laws,191 and even the state criminal cases have left
some room for the accommodation. 192 Put another way, what distin-
guishes these statutory exemptions from other accommodations, such
that they cannot survive scrutiny while others can?
The rationales of the Court's accommodation cases should prove
instructive. Unfortunately, however, they present a confusing and
often contradictory picture, out of which it is difficult to weave a co-
herent thread. One set of permissible accommodations involves situa-
tions where "the benefits derived by religious organizations flowed to
a large number of nonreligious groups as well.' 193 A primary example
is Walz v. Tax Commission,194 involving property tax exemptions for
houses of religious worship as one type of a variety of nonprofit,
quasi-public institutions such as hospitals, libraries, and scientific and
historical groups. Cases upholding bus service and textbooks for stu-
dents attending private schools, including religiously affiliated
schools, 195 would also fit this paradigm. Another factor, again perti-
nent in Walz, is whether the law provides a uniform benefit to all reli-
gious organizations, and thus avoids favoring one or a few. 96
Although its importance to the case is unclear, this feature was obvi-
ously present in Amos.197 It also characterizes "released time" educa-
tional programs (at least in principle). 98 Neither of these "breadth"
factors applies to spiritual treatment accommodation statutes; only
191. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that state courts regard as criminal
only that behavior which poses severe danger to the child's life or health).
193. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (striking down, under Estab-
lishment Clause principles, a state sales tax exemption for religious publications promul-
gating religious teachings while the sales of other kinds of publications were taxed).
194. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
195. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
196. Walz, 397 U.S. at 664; see Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 12 (1989); Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
197. Amos, 483 U.S. at 327.
198. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (equating the released time pro-
gram with the granting of requests to leave school to attend mass, for Yom Kippur, or for a
Protestant baptismal ceremony). Justice Douglas noted, "[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being" and concluded that "[w]hen the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Id. at
313-14. It appears unlikely that such a statement would appear in a modem opinion, given
current Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., supra note 128 and cases cited therein.
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religious actors are benefitted by them, and then only those of a par-
ticular religious viewpoint.
Legislative prayer has been justified by the Court on historical
grounds,199 and the use of religious with secular symbols in holiday
displays has also been traced to historical roots in a celebration now
regarded as secular in nature.200 As noted earlier, however, spiritual
treatment exemptions are of relatively recent origin;2 history and
tradition do not play a role in exemptions to medical care otherwise
required by anti-child abuse/neglect laws.
In any event, the exception of religiously motivated actors from a
general governmental regulation because of a unique belief presents a
different kind of accommodation from those just cited, requiring a dif-
ferent kind of analysis. The closest parallel in permissive accommoda-
tion cases would appear to be those upholding exemptions for
conscientious objectors from combat service: each policy favors relig-
iously motivated individuals of a particular minority religious view-
point and excepts them from an otherwise applicable general standard
of behavior. The cases, however, are hopelessly deficient as sources of
general principles of acceptable accommodation. Chief Justice
White's opinion in the first of these, the Selective Draft Law Cases,2 "2
is unsurpassingly unhelpful: "we pass without anything but statement
the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference
with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment re-
sulted from the exemption clauses of the act.., because we think its
unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more."2"3 Succeeding
cases have concerned only the meaning of the phrase "religious train-
ing and belief' in the exemption or its applicability to those opposed
only to service in unjust wars." 4 The opinions characterize the ex-
199. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-87 (1983).
200. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984); see supra note 189 and accompanying text. In most
of the cases cited in this section, the accommodation has been saved from invalidation
under the Establishment Clause largely on the grounds that it serves to keep government
and religion disentangled, or to prevent the intrusion of government into religious matters,
thereby preserving the separation of church and state.
201. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text (legislative history).
202. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
203. Id. at 389-90.
204. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-54 (1971) (justifying refusal to ex-
tend exemption to those opposed only to service in unjust wars); Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970) (extending exemption to atheist with conscientious scruples); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining "religious training and belief" broadly
to include "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption").
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emptions as "neutral" in the sense that they do not discriminate
among religions,20 5 pragmatic in their realization that conscientious
objectors would not make effective fighting troops,20 6 and permissible
as accommodations of free exercise values, "in line with 'our happy
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of
conscience."' 20 7
A generally worded statutory exemption for religiously motivated
parental behavior concerning medical decisions for a child also does
not discriminate among religions as such20° and may be aimed at the
free exercise value of avoiding "unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience." These descriptions alone, however, are insufficient
criteria for the permissibility of a governmental accommodation to
religion that lies outside the requirements of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.20 9
B. A Proposed Test
Two of the Supreme Court's recent discussions of the permissible
scope of religious accommodation may prove helpful in arriving at a
workable jurisprudence to apply to the spiritual treatment exemption
problem. Although some commentators find the two cases inconsis-
tent,210 at least one other agrees that together they may point the way
to a cohesive philosophy.21 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
205. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 451-53.
206. Id. at 453 (citing Welsh, 398 U.S. at 369 (White, J., dissenting)). This provides a
strong secular purpose for the policy, as required by traditional Establishment Clause doc-
trine. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
207. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634
(1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
208. But see statutes cited supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (singling out the
Christian Science denomination or members of a "recognized church" for the exemption);
note, however, that the former federal regulation used general language, as do most state
statutes; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
209. Their military setting detracts still further from the potential usefulness of the con-
scientious objector cases; the Court has consistently maintained strong deference to Con-
gressional and military judgment in matters having to do with the national defense. See,
e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding the Air Force's power to
forbid a clinical psychologist, who was an ordained rabbi, from wearing a yarmulke while
in uniform).
210. See, e.g., Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 57, at 564 (stating that the two cases
together "reveal substantial uncertainty within the Court's current membership concerning
the scope of permissible accommodations"); Tshnet, supra note 47, at 388 (commenting
that "It]he result in Texas Monthly was not easy to reconcile with Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos.").
211. See McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at 696-98 (construing both cases as pro-
accommodationist).
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Amos, 1 2 a unanimous decision,211 upheld Title VIi's exemption for
religious organizations from the prohibition against discrimination in
employment on the basis of religion, even with respect to the organi-
zations' secular nonprofit activities. Justice White, for the Court, cast
favor upon a "benevolent neutrality"21 4 which permits a "legislative
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions."2"5 Despite the fact that religion was singled out for a bene-
fit, accommodation in Title VII was appropriate because it was lifting
a regulation that itself burdened the exercise of religion; thus, similar
benefits for secular entities were unnecessary.21 6 Equal protection
principles were not violated because all religious organizations re-
ceived the same benefit, and the classification of religious organiza-
tions was related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating a
government-imposed burden correctly perceived as an onus on free
exercise values.217
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,"8 the Court invalidated an ex-
emption for religious publications from a sales tax imposed on all
other publications. Although this case, like Amos, involved lifting
from the shoulders of religious organizations a burden otherwise im-
posed by government, that relief was not seen by Justice Brennan in
his plurality opinion as having the legitimate purpose sanctioned in
Amos:
[W]hen government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious or-
ganizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and
that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reason-
ably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent
to the free exercise of religion . . . it "provide[s] unjustifiable
awards of assistance to religious organizations" and cannot but
"conve[y] a message of endorsement" to slighted members of
the community.219
212. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
213. Justice White wrote the opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Powell, Stevens, and Scalia joined. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred
separately, as did Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor.
214. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
215. Id. at 335.
216. Id. at 338.
217. Id. at 339.
218. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
219. Id. at 15 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment)).
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Brennan's views in Texas Monthly, together with the analysis of
Amos,220 suggest the following criteria for evaluating the permissibil-
ity of an accommodation directed exclusively at religious actors: (1)
the accommodation should lift a state-imposed burden from the reli-
gious actor; (2) the burden should pose a significant deterrent to the
free exercise of religion (although the relief need not be mandated by
the Free Exercise Clause for the accommodation to be valid); and (3)
nonbeneficiaries should not be markedly burdened by the accommo-
dation to the religious actor.221
Although the Texas Monthly rationale represents the consensus
of only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, it was not per se re-
pudiated by Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor (although the
latter two would probably permit broader instances of accommoda-
tion than would the Texas Monthly plurality).222 In any event, these
criteria present an extremely helpful framework for analyzing the
"narrow channel" between the "Scylla and Charybdis' 223 of the two
220. This discussion assumes that the pre-Smith demarcations of the "zone of accom-
modation" have not been disturbed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See supra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text. Both Amos and Texas Monthly were decided prior to
Smith.
221. Although Justice Brennan appears to view the first and third criteria in the disjunc-
tive, the suggestion here is that all three should be met in order for the non-mandated
accommodation to be viewed as permissible. Accord McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at
687 ("[Tlhere is no legitimate claim for accommodation when the obstacles to religious
exercise are not caused by the government and the failure of the government to accommo-
date would not constitute unequal treatment."). McConnell also agrees that a weighing of
the burdens on nonbeneficiaries is crucial to an evaluation of the permissibility of accom-
modations, but he proposes a slightly different analysis from Justice Brennan's; id. at 702-
05 (finding "substantial burdens" an unsatisfactory test and advocating a balancing of the
burdens to nonbeneficiaries against the impact on religious practice); see also infra notes
228-31 and accompanying text (discussing support for each of the three criteria).
222. Justice White concurred in the judgment on the basis of the Free Press Clause.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, con-
cluded that "[a] statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our
most basic understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about and hence is consti-
tutionally intolerable." Id. at 28. However, they did find that Justice Brennan's opinion
subordinated the Free Exercise Clause, and indicated possible approval of a statute also
exempting "philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious organizations devoted to
such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being and nonbeing, right and
wrong." Id. at 27-28. Their reservations would not be applicable in the governmental ac-
commodations under consideration here, as a similar secular exception to child abuse and
neglect statutes is difficult to conceive.
223. Id. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice Brennan would completely block off the
already narrow 'channel between the Scylla [of what the Free Exercise Clause demands]
[sic] and the Charybdis [of what the Establishment Clause forbids] [sic] through which any
state or federal action must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.") (citing
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. EmpI. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
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religion clause concepts, and they also help point the way to the defi-
ciencies in legislative accommodations for parents providing spiritual
treatment alone to their severely ill children.2' Justice Brennan's cri-
teria are better suited to a religious exemption question than is the
Lemon test.' Just as Justice O'Connor offered her "endorsement"
concept as a "clarification" of the Lemon criteria in an accommoda-
tion context, 2 Justice Brennan's three principles help to provide a
definition for "endorsement," giving it the substance and specificity
seen as lacking by its critics.2217
Each factor helps to preserve the constitutionally necessary neu-
trality between government, on the one hand, and religious actors, on
the other. The requirement that the accommodation provide relief
from a burden imposed by the state, rather than one resulting from
the behavior of private actors, prevents legislative overreaching in
favor of religiously motivated individuals or organizations.22s The
need for the burden to pose a significant deterrent to free exercise
values provides a constitutionally acceptable rationale for according
224. For an accommodationist's view substantially agreeing with Brennan's criteria, see
McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at 698-708 (noting also that he would add a fourth
requirement, that the accommodation be "provided to all similarly situated religions with-
out favoritism or discrimination") Id. at 698.
225. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of Lemon
for analyzing an accommodation to religiously motivated behavior).
226. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
227. Justice Brennan's invocation of the language of "endorsement" in his Texas
Monthly opinion suggests this connection; see supra note 219 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the "endorsement"
test).
228. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating a
state statute requiring private employers to provide employees with an absolute right not
to work on their Sabbath). Other Justices have agreed that a valid accommodation must
consist of the lifting of a government-imposed burden; see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2677 (1992) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
("[A]ccommodation must lift a discernible burden on the free exercise of religion."); Cor-
poration of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("Of course, in order to perceive a government action as a permissible
accommodation of religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of
religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action."). At least one leading
accommodationist has made a similar statement: see McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at
686-87 (suggesting that exemption, as one form of accommodation [the form at issue in this
Article], is appropriate when government action itself has caused the obstacle to religious
exercise). McConnell's definition of "accommodation" would go farther than exemption,
however; see id. at 712 ("[Clontrary to language in recent accommodation cases ... the
government should be able to require accommodations in the private sector, at least where
it has extended comparable protections to secular concerns of a similar character.") (citing
the example of the litle VII requirement that employers make "reasonable accommoda-
tions" to the religious needs of their employees.).
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some privilege to behavior that, absent the religious motivation,
would be subject to governmental prohibition2 29 Finally, the require-
ment that nonbeneficiaries not be markedly burdened by the accom-
modation to the religious actor230 helps ensure that the relief will be
narrowly tied to the legitimate purpose of alleviating free exercise
burdens and also preserves equal protection principles, which would
ordinarily prohibit favoring religious over nonreligious actors or reli-
gious over nonreligious motivations. 3'
C. Spiritual Treatment Exemptions Fail the Accommodation Test
1. The Framework Applied
Statutory exemptions from child abuse and neglect laws for relig-
iously motivated parents who choose to treat their children's medical
conditions by spiritual treatment alone meet the first two criteria de-
lineated by Justice Brennan, but not the third.332 As was the case in
229. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2677 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concur-
ring); Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (see supra note 122 and accompanying text for discussion); Id.
at 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (all discussing the appropriateness of an exemp-
tion when the burden on free exercise values posed by government is significant).
230. Accommodationists seem to agree that a valid accommodation must meet this cri-
terion. See McConnell, Update, supra note 62, at 692 n.28 ("Of course, the [religious exer-
cise] right is limited by the rights of others .... ."); id. at 693 ("[S]ome laws are so necessary
to the common good that exceptions would be intolerable."); id. at 702-05 (discussing with
favor Brennan's third criterion and suggesting that its application involve a weighing of the
burden on religious practice if the accommodation is not accorded against the burden on
other interests if the accommodation is permitted); McConnell, Accommodation, supra
note 62, at 31 ("Where the government determines that it can make an exception without
unacceptable damage to its policies, there is no reason for a court to second-guess that
conclusion unless the constitutional rights of other persons are adversely affected.") (empha-
sis added); id. at 37-38 ("[R]eligious accommodations often, perhaps always, impose some
costs on others .... The question, however.., is whether recognition of the believer's right
to accommodation 'serve[s] [sic] to abridge any other person's religious liberties."') (quot-
ing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963)). Judging from some of his general lan-
guage, Douglas Laycock apparently agrees, see Laycock, Remnants, supra note 61, at 30
("A right to religious exemptions from regulation cannot be absolute; the state must be
able to override it for sufficiently compelling reasons."); id. at 33 ("The question should
not be whether it would be better on the whole to deny the exemption, but whether a
particular religious exercise is doing such severe and tangible harm that the Court can
imply from necessity" that an accommodation should not be accorded). For an argument
that the exemptions at issue are invalid precisely because they trample upon the constitu-
tionally protected rights of the affected children, including their religious liberties, see infra
notes 237-66 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 146 and cases cited therein (discussing Establishment Clause re-
quirement that government not favor religion over nonreligion).
232. Although Justice Brennan stated his first and third criteria in the disjunctive, a
failure of either would be sufficient, in his view, to defeat the accommodation. See supra
note 219 and accompanying text.
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both Amos and Texas Monthly, the exemptions relieve religious actors
from a government-imposed burden, for the statutes themselves de-
fine the forbidden conduct and impose on parents the duty of ade-
quate medical care for their minor children."3 As in Amos, but unlike
the situation in Texas Monthly, the burden works a "significant state-
imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion."'234 Reliance upon
spiritual healing, and the concomitant shunning of conventional medi-
cal care, lie at the heart of the religious practices of those currently
protected by the exemptions.2a The difference from Amos, however,
and the factor that makes these accommodations, like that in Texas
Monthly, impermissible, is that their operation does "burden
nonbeneficiaries markedly.'"" 6 Furthermore, the nonbeneficiaries
who are so heavily burdened are drawn from perhaps the most vulner-
able group in our entire population, children, whose welfare the abuse
and neglect statutes seek to protect.
2. The Statutes Violate Children's Free Exercise Rights
Justice Douglas's partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yodel, 7 suc-
cinctly points out the fallacy of focusing on parental rights alone in an
evaluation of a religious accommodation affecting decisionmaking for
children: "If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption,
the inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty
upon their children.'" s He buttressed his position by noting that
"[r]eligion is an individual experience,' 2 39 that "the children them-
233. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing federal regulation requiring
"adequate medical care"); supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (citations to child abuse/
neglect statutes).
234. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); see supra notes 219-21 and
accompanying text (discussing the passage).
235. See, e.g., J. Thomas Black, Christian Science Convictions, reprinted in FREEDOM
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALING FOR CHILDREN 27 (1989); Allison W.
Phinney, Jr., What Is Christian Science Treatment?, reprinted in FREEDOM AND RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra at 21; Nathan A. Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, re-
printed in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY supra at 18; see also MARY B. EDDY, Science,
Theology, Medicine, in SCIENCE AND HEALTH wITH KEY TO Tm SCRIPrURES 107-64
(1991); see generally Tr CHRISTIAN SCIENCE PUBLISHING SOCIETY, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE:
A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS (1990); see also Clark, supra note 111, at
568-69 (noting that Christian Scientists believe that disease can be controlled through spiri-
tual healing); Monopoli, supra note 3, at 339 n.118 (noting that spiritual healing is a basic
tenet of Christian Science).
236. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15; see supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the passage).
237. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
238. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
239. Id. at 243.
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selves have constitutionally protectible interests,"' 4 and that "[it is
the future of the [minor] student, not the future of the parents, that is
imperiled by today's decision."24' Justice Douglas was unsatisfied
with the majority's answer that the criminal statute applied only to the
children's parents, and that it was the parents, not their children, who
would be subjected to penalties for violations.24 2 In his view, the chil-
dren's rights at issue were too important, and the potential effects of
cutting off their education after the eighth grade too deleterious to
their well-being,243 to justify the majority's narrow focus upon the par-
ents' interests. To the argument of the court below that "'[wihen a
child reaches the age of judgment, he can choose for himself his reli-
gion,""'2  Justice Douglas responded that the high school age children
whose welfare was at stake in the case were already sufficiently ma-
ture to have the right at least to be heard before the Court rendered a
binding decision in their parents' favor.245
Even assuming that the majority drew the appropriate accommo-
dation line in the Yoder case itself, Justice Douglas's cogent arguments
apply with much greater force to an exemption permitting parents to
choose spiritual treatment over conventional medical care for their
severely ill minor children. Those children, too, have constitutional
rights to the protection of their lives and to their own free exercise
values. Child neglect laws are an important protection of children's
lives and welfare. Although parents have the right to inculcate their
own religious views in their children,246 the children have no concomi-
tant duty to adopt those views or to follow their parents' religious
practices. The effect of the spiritual treatment exemptions, however,
is to enable parents to force harmful religious practices upon their
children.2 47 Furthermore, unlike the circumstances in Yoder, the chil-
dren subjected to spiritual treatment alone frequently are not suffi-
ciently mature even to entertain their own religious or medical views,
let alone to express their opinions or to make choices on their own
behalf2 48 If the consequences of their parents' choices are permanent
240. Id.
241. Id. at 245.
242. See id. at 230-31.
243. Id. at 240 (White, Brennan and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
244. Id. at 245 n.3 (quoting State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Wis. 1971)).
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 236-66 and accompanying text (discussing the proposition that
such imposition is prohibited under the Establishment Clause).
248. See SwAN, supra note 6, at 1-15 (listing forty-two prosecutions and their results;
many of the children involved were infants; few were over the age of 10).
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debilitation or death, the children will never have the opportunity to
make their own compensatory choices in later life in order to correct
the deficiency. The Court's opinion in Yoder distinguished the situa-
tion there from Prince v. Massachusetts4 9 and similar instances refus-
ing accommodation, characterizing the case as "not one in which any
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public
safety, peace, order or welfare has been demonstrated or may be
properly inferred." 5° The clear implication of Chief Justice Burger's
statement was that if such harm were at stake, the outcome would be
different. Obviously, it is precisely "harm to the physical or mental
health of the child" that forms the central concern of child abuse and
neglect statutes. It is directly endangered by exemptions from those
statutes for religiously motivated parental conduct.
3. The Exemptions Violate Children's Rights to Equal Protection of the
Laws
Spiritual treatment exemptions also violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.251 As previously noted, these
laws ensure that some group of children will be denied the "adequate
medical care" deemed necessary by the legislature to protect their
health and welfare.252 The question becomes whether the legislature
may permissibly deny to that group of children the protections that it
demands for all others. Put another way, can legislatures vary the def-
inition of child abuse/neglect between one set of children and another
based upon the religious beliefs of their parents?
Under classic equal protection analysis, children have never been
defined as a "discrete and insular minority, ' 253 such that courts should
subject legislative distinctions concerning their welfare to a height-
ened level of review." Indeed, that notion has been specifically re-
249. 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
250. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230 (1972). Also citing Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (see supra note 93 and accompanying text).
251. See supra note 21.
252. Accord Monopoli, supra note 3, at 347 (quoting State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d
931, 935 (Ohio Ct. Com. P. 1984) (."[I]f the real purpose of [the neglect statute] is to
protect children from parental defalcation, then the prayer exception creates a group of
children who will never be so protected, through no fault or choice of their own."') There-
fore the exemption violates equal protection guarantees. See also supra notes 6, 8, 110-11
and accompanying text.
253. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
254. Justice Stone's famous footnote, supra note 253, has become the touchstone for
identifying classifications of people eligible for heightened scrutiny under equal protection
analysis, see TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-13, at 1465 and n.2 and authorities cited therein.
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jected.2 5 Nonetheless, cases specifically affecting children show a
marked consistency in the special regard courts pay to both the vul-
nerability of children and their powerlessness to control their own sit-
uations." 6 Plyler v. Doe3 7 is especially instructive. Faced with the
question of whether the Equal Protection Clause required Texas to
finance the education of children who were undocumented aliens, the
Supreme Court rejected arguments both that the classification drawn
by the legislature was "suspect" and that education was a "fundamen-
tal right.""2  On the other hand, the Court was acutely aware that
"the children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect neither their
parents' conduct nor their own status." '259 This fact, together with the
importance of education and "the lasting impact of its deprivation on
the life of the child,"260 led the Court to the conclusion that Texas
could not rationally limit the protections of its laws as between one
group of children and another, based upon their parents' behavior, in
the manner that its legislature had chosen.261
Adequate medical care is also not a fundamental right; it is not
even, like education, a government-provided benefit or service. Child
abuse and neglect statutes do, however, seek to ensure that all chil-
dren will receive adequate medical care by imposing on their parents
or guardians a duty to provide it; indeed, federal regulations require
states to enact such legislation in order to retain eligibility for federal
assistance to their child welfare programs.262 As with education, the
"lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child"26 3 makes
adequate medical care a subject of special concern, and the powerless-
ness of the affected children to act on their own behalf should en-
hance our sense of urgency to deal with this problem. As already
255. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see infra note 258 and accompanying text.
256. In addition to the cases cited in this discussion, the Court's cases concerning classi-
fications of children based on illegitimacy are an example of this sensitivity. Such classifi-
cations are now subject to intermediate scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988);
see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
257. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
258. Id. at 223.
259. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770).
260. Id. at 221. In its lengthy discussion of the importance of education, the Court
cited, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
221-23.
261. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
262. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
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discussed,' it is no answer that the exemptions attempt to serve the
children's parents' free exercise rights; it is the free exercise rights of
the children and their rights to equal protection under the laws that
are implicated here.
The common law doctrine of parens patriae, according to which
the sovereign has special obligations to minor children within its juris-
diction,26s buttresses the concept that the legislature must impose the
same duties on all parents or guardians when it seeks to ensure the
welfare of their children. When a court must make a specific decision
affecting a particular child-such as a custody decision or an order for
specified medical care-the standard guiding principal is the best in-
terests of the child; parents' rights are subsidiary.2 66 Given our soci-
ety's concern for the welfare of children, and the statutory
presumption that failure to provide them with certain necessaries con-
stitutes abuse or neglect, it is incomprehensible that the law would
permit different definitions of abuse or neglect to pertain to different
children, depending upon their various parents' religious beliefs and
practices. Such an approach is a blatant violation of children's rights
to equal protection of the laws.
Conclusion: Parental Rights as the Appropriate Source for
Medical Decisionmaking for Minor Children
Spiritual treatment exemptions from child abuse and neglect stat-
utes violate both the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is not to derogate the fact that parents have constitutionally protected
rights to bring up and educate their children as they see fit and that
these rights generally include the right to make decisions about their
minor children's medical care. Parental decisionmaking rights are
grounded in the notion that the family is much better situated than
government to discern the best interests of minor children and in the
presumption that parents will generally act accordingly. In Parham v.
J.R.,267 holding that parents could commit their child to a state mental
institution pursuant to voluntary commitment procedures, the
Supreme Court stated:
264. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
266. CLARK, supra note 29, § 9.3, at 335-338 (medical treatment); id. at 788 ("[W]hen
the child's welfare seems to conflict with the claims of one or both parents, the child's
welfare must prevail."); id. at 824-27 (custody).
267. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
774 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:725
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that
course; our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion
that a child is "the mere creature of the State" and, on the con-
trary, asserted that parents generally "have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] [sic]
for additional obligations." Surely, this includes a "high duty"
to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical
advice. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult de-
cisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natu-
ral bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.26
The Court went on to note that incidents of child abuse and neglect
ran counter to the usual presumption and justified government inter-
vention; otherwise, parents should normally have decisionmaking au-
thority even in cases where constitutional rights of children are
identifiable, so long as there are adequate safeguards for the latter.269
In this regard, the Court specifically "recognized that a state is not
without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.""27
The analysis of Parham v. J.R. provides the appropriate frame-
work for the evaluation of parental medical decisionmaking rights on
behalf of minor children, whether or not the parents are religiously
motivated in their actions. Generally, parents of minor children have
a duty to provide them with "adequate medical care." If the children
are too young to make their own choices, their parents have both the
freedom and the responsibility to make health care decisions for them.
Of course, the parents' perspectives and values, including their reli-
gious beliefs, will play a part in the choices they make. The state,
however, has defined the parameters of parental freedom: failure to
provide adequate medical care amounts to child abuse or neglect and
entitles the state to step in and take over the supervision of a child's
medical treatment or to punish parents whose violation of their statu-
tory duty has resulted in harm to a child. At this point, the nature of
the parents' motivations (whether religious or not) is irrelevant; the
268. Id. at 602 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)) (other
citations omitted).
269. Id. at 602-03.
270. Id. at 603 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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important considerations are the rights and welfare of the affected
children.
Any other approach, although appearing out of respect for par-
ents' religious freedom,271 lends government support to the particular
religious choices of certain adults at the expense of the religious and
equal protection rights of their children. Such governmental behavior
amounts to an endorsement of the adults' religious practices, which
violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The invalida-
tion or repeal of spiritual treatment exemptions from child abuse and
neglect statutes would leave in place neutral laws allowing full consti-
tutional play to parental decisionmaking rights while fulfilling the
state's obligation to protect the health and welfare of children and
according to them their own religious freedom and rights to equal pro-
tection of the laws. This course of action is the only way to serve the
entire complex of constitutional values at stake in this knotty problem.
271. There in fact is a question with respect to how intrusive upon parental religious
rights the neutral laws advocated here would actually be. Although it is true that spiritual
healing is a basic tenet of, for example, the Christian Science Church (undoubtedly the
largest group affected), see supra note 235 and accompanying text, it is worthy of special
note that "[]n Great Britain and Canada, where medical care is mandatory for all children,
the church allows its practitioners to pray for children who are also receiving medical
care." Andrew Skolnick, Religious Exemptions to Child Neglect Laws Still Being Passed
Despite Convictions of Parents, 264 JAMA 1226 (1990).

